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Abstract
We have two aims. The main one is to expound the idea of renormalization
in quantum field theory, with no technical prerequisites (Sections 2 and 3). Our
motivation is that renormalization is undoubtedly one of the great ideas—and
great successes—of twentieth-century physics. Also it has strongly influenced,
in diverse ways, how physicists conceive of physical theories. So it is of consid-
erable philosophical interest. Second, we will briefly relate renormalization to
Ernest Nagel’s account of inter-theoretic relations, especially reduction (Section
4).
One theme will be a contrast between two approaches to renormalization.
The old approach, which prevailed from ca 1945 to 1970, treated renormaliz-
ability as a necessary condition for being an acceptable quantum field theory.
On this approach, it is a piece of great good fortune that high energy physicists
can formulate renormalizable quantum field theories that are so empirically
successful. But the new approach to renormalization (from 1970 onwards) ex-
plains why the phenomena we see, at the energies we can access in our particle
accelerators, are described by a renormalizable quantum field theory. For what-
ever non-renormalizable interactions may occur at yet higher energies, they are
insignificant at accessible energies. Thus the new approach explains why our
best fundamental theories have a feature, viz. renormalizability, which the old
approach treated as a selection principle for theories.
That is worth saying since philosophers tend to think of scientific explana-
tion as only explaining an individual event, or perhaps a single law, or at most
deducing one theory as a special case of another. Here we see a framework in
which there is a space of theories. And this framework is powerful enough to
deduce that what seemed “manna from heaven” (that some renormalizable the-
ories are empirically successful) is to be expected: the good fortune is generic.
We also maintain that universality, a concept stressed in renormalization
theory, is essentially the familiar philosophical idea of multiple realizability;
and that it causes no problems for reductions of a Nagelian kind.
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2
1 Introduction
We have two aims. The main one is to expound the idea of renormalization in quan-
tum field theory, with no technical prerequisites (Sections 2 and 3). Our motivation
is that renormalization is undoubtedly one of the great ideas—and great successes—
of twentieth-century physics. Also it has strongly influenced, in diverse ways, how
physicists conceive of physical theories. So it is of considerable philosophical in-
terest. Second, we will briefly relate renormalization to Ernest Nagel’s account of
inter-theoretic relations, especially reduction (Section 4).1
One main point will turn on a contrast between two approaches to renormaliza-
tion. The traditional approach was pioneered by Dyson, Feynman, Schwinger and
Tomonaga in 1947-50: they showed how it tamed the infinities occurring in quantum
electrodynamics, and also agreed with experiments measuring effects due to vacuum
fluctuations in the electromagnetic field—even to several significant figures. After
these triumphs of quantum electrodynamics, this approach continued to prevail for
two decades. For this paper, the main point is that it treats renormalizability as
a necessary condition for being an acceptable quantum field theory. So according
to this approach, it is a piece of great good fortune that high energy physicists can
formulate renormalizable quantum field theories that are so empirically successful; as
they in fact did, after about 1965, for forces other than electromagnetism—the weak
and strong forces.
But between 1965 and 1975, another approach to renormalization was established
by the work of Wilson, Kadanoff, Fisher etc. (taking inspiration from ideas in sta-
tistical mechanics as much as in quantum field theory). This approach explains why
the phenomena we see, at the energies we can access in our particle accelerators,
are described by a renormalizable quantum field theory. In short, the explanation
is: whatever non-renormalizable interactions may occur at yet higher energies, they
are insignificant at accessible energies. Thus the modern approach explains why our
best fundamental theories have a feature, viz. renormalizability, which the traditional
approach treated as a selection principle for theories. (So to continue the metaphor
above: one might say that these theories’ infinities are not just tamed, but domesti-
cated.)
That point is worth making since philosophers tend to think of scientific expla-
nation as only explaining an individual event, or perhaps a single law, or at most
deducing one theory as a special case of, or a good approximation of, another. This
last is of course the core idea of Nagel’s account of inter-theoretic reduction. The
modern approach to renormalization is more ambitious: it explains, indeed deduces,
a striking feature (viz. renormalizability) of a whole class of theories. It does this by
1That Section is brief because one of us (JB) discusses Nagelian themes more fully in a companion
paper (2014). From now on, it will be clearest to use ‘we’ for a contextually indicated community
e.g. of physicists, as in ‘our best physical theories’; and ‘I’ for the authors, e.g, in announcing a plan
for the paper like ‘In Section 2, I will’.
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making precise mathematical sense of the ideas of a space of theories, and a flow on
the space. It is by analyzing this flow that one deduces that what seemed “manna
from heaven” (that some renormalizable theories are empirically successful) is to be
expected: the good fortune we have had is generic.
But I will urge that this point is not a problem for Nagel’s account of inter-
theoretic relations. On the contrary: it is a striking example of the power of Nagelian
reduction. And I will end with an ancillary point, which also strikes a Nagelian note. I
will argue that universality, a concept stressed in renormalization theory, is essentially
the familiar philosophical idea of multiple realizability; and I will claim (following
Sober, Shapiro and others) that multiple realizability does not cause problems for
reductions of a Nagelian kind.
The plan is as follows. I sketch the old and new approaches to renormalization
in Sections 2 and 3.2 Then in Section 4, I shall maintain that these developments
accord with Nagel’s doctrines.
2 Renormalization: the traditional approach
2.1 Prospectus: corrections needed
Consider a classical point-particle acting as the source of a gravitational or electro-
static potential. There is no problem about using the measured force F felt by a
test-particle at a given distance r from the source, to calculate the mass or charge
(respectively) of the source particle.
Thus in the electrostatic case, for a test-particle of unit charge, the force is given
by minus the derivative of the potential energy V with respect to the distance r
between the source and the test-particle. In symbols, this is, for a source of charge
e (neglecting constants): F = −∇V (r) ∼ −∇ − e/r ≡ −e/r2 . We then invert
this equation to calculate that the source’s charge is: e = −F.r2. (Adding in the
constants: F = −e
4piε0r2
, where ε0 is the permittivity of free space (electric constant),
implies that e = −F (4piε0r2).)
This straightforward calculation of the source’s mass or charge does not work in
quantum field theory! There are complicated corrections we must deal with: perhaps
unsurprisingly, since it amounts to trying to characterize one aspect of an interacting
many-field system in a way that is comparatively simple and independent of the rest
of the system. The corrections will depend on the energy and-or momentum with
2I will give very few references to the technical literature; as perhaps befits a primer. But I rec-
ommend: (i) Baez’s colloquial introductions (2006, 2009), of which Sections 2 and 3 are an expansion
into more academic prose; (ii) Wilson’s Scientific American article (1979) and Aitchison (1985)’s
introduction to quantum field theory, especially its vacuum, which discusses renormalization in Sec-
tions 3.1, 3.4, 3.6, 5.3, 6.1; (iii) Teller (1989) and Hartmann (2001) as philosophical introductions;
(iv) Kadanoff’s masterly surveys (2009, 2013), which emphasize both history and aspects concerning
condensed matter—here treated in Section 3.3.
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which the test particle approaches the source. A bit more exactly, since of course the
test particle and source are equally minuscule: the corrections depend on the energy
(or momentum) with which we theoretically describe, or experimentally probe, the
system I called the ‘source’. We will write µ for this energy; and the corrections
depending on µ will be centre-stage in both the traditional and the modern approaches
to renormalization (this Section and the next).
This Section lays out the traditional approach in four subsections. In Section
2.2, I introduce the idea that the medium or field around the source can affect the
observed value of its mass or charge. In quantum field theory, this is often expressed
in the jargon of “virtual states” or “ virtual particles”. Again: it is a matter of the
energy-scale µ at which we describe or probe the source.
Then in Section 2.3, I report that to get finite predictions, quantum field theory
needs a regularization scheme. The archetypal scheme is to neglect energies above a
certain value Λ; equivalently, one neglects variations in fields that occur on a spatial
scale smaller than some small length d. I also adopt length as the fundamental di-
mension, so that I express regularization as a cut-off length d, rather than an energy
Λ.
In Section 2.4, I present the core task of the traditional approach to renormal-
ization. Since the theory assumes spacetime is a continuum, while d is our arbitrary
choice, we need to show consistency while letting d tend to 0. That is: we must find
an assignment of intrinsic charges (electric charge, mass etc.: called bare coupling
constants), to the sources, as a function of the diminishing d, which delivers back the
observed value of the charges: i.e. the values we in fact measure at the energy-scale µ
at which we probe the system. These measured values are called the physical coupling
constants. If we can do this, we say our theory is renormalizable.
This requirement is weak, or liberal, in two ways. First: we even allow that the
assigned intrinsic charge is infinite at the limit d → 0. (It is this allowance that a
bare coupling constants be infinite that makes many—including great physicists like
Dirac—uneasy.)
Second (Section 2.5): we allow that we might have to add other terms to our the-
ory (to be precise: to the Lagrangian or Hamiltonian), in order to make a consistent
assignment. But we only allow a finite number of such terms: this reflects the fact
that our framework of calculation is perturbative.
Then in Section 2.6, I report (the simplest rendition of) Dyson’s criterion for
when a theory is renormalizable: the dimension (as a power of length) of the bare
coupling constant(s) needs to be less than or equal to zero. Finally, I report the
happy news that our theories of the electromagnetic, weak and strong forces are in
this sense renormalizable. Why we should be so fortunate is a good question: which,
as announced in Section 1, I will take up in Section 3.
5
2.2 Renormalizing a coupling constant
Underlying the details to come, there is a simple idea, which is valid classically and
indeed an everyday experience. Imagine a ping pong ball under the surface of the
water in a bath. It is buoyant: in terms of the gravitational field, it has a negative
mass. So the idea is: the medium in which a system is immersed can alter the param-
eters associated with the system, even the parameters like an electric or gravitational
charge, i.e. its coupling constants.
Agreed, in this example we of course retain the notion that the ball has a positive
intrinsic mass, not least because it can be taken out of the water and then will fall
under gravity. But three factors make this notion more problematic in fundamental
physics, especially in quantum theory.
(i): We cannot take the system out of the field of force, which is all-pervasive,
though varying in strength from place to place.
(ii): Even in classical physics, there are important differences between the elec-
tromagnetic and gravitational fields: differences that make it wrong, or at least more
questionable, to conceptually detach an electric charge from the electromagnetic field,
than it is to detach a mass from the gravitational field. In short, the difference is
that the gravitational field, but not the electromagnetic field, can be thought of as
a mere mathematical device giving the disposition of a test-particle to accelerate:
cf. the field V above. On the other hand, the electromagnetic field has energy and
momentum, and effects propagate through it at a finite speed: this leads to subtle
issues about the self-energy of a classical charged particle.3
(iii): In quantum field theory, matter is represented by a quantum field, just as ra-
diation (electromagnetism) is. The matter is represented by a fermionic field; e.g. in
quantum electrodynamics, the electron field. And interactions (forces) between mat-
ter are represented by a bosonic field; e.g. in quantum electrodynamics, the quantized
electromagnetic field, whose excitations are photons. In short: the physical system is
an interacting many-field system, so that it makes little sense to conceptually detach
one of the fields from the others. All the more so, if we think of our fields as effective,
not fundamental: I return to this in Section 3.
In short: we need to take seriously, in our theoretical description as much as our
experimental practice, that the system of interest, e.g. an electron (or excitation of
the electron field), is immersed in a wider system through which we “access” it. This
has two aspects which we need to spell out. The second is more briefly stated, and is
fundamental: it will dominate the sequel. But the first sets the stage.
3For these issues, cf. Zuchowski (2013) and references therein. Broader philosophical aspects of
classical fields are discussed by Hesse (1965), McMullin (2002) and Lange (2002).
6
2.2.1 Virtual particles and perturbation theory
First, we need the ideas of: virtual states, also often called virtual particles, which
arise in the context of perturbation theory.
In quantum theory, we typically solve a problem by finding the states of definite
energy and their corresponding values of energy. These are the energy eigenstates,
i.e. eigenstates of the Hamiltonian (energy-function), and their eigenvalues. For once
these are known, most of what we might want to know can be calculated. Usually, we
cannot exactly calculate the eigenstates: the Hamiltonian is intractable. (The Hamil-
tonian H is essentially a matrix, and calculating the eigenstates and eigenvalues is a
matter of changing bases in the vector space of states so as to render the Hamiltonian
matrix diagonal i.e. to make all non-diagonal entries zero.) But often enough, H is
“close” to another Hamiltonian, H0 say, which is tractable, in that we can calculate
H0’s eigenstates. Here, closeness means, roughly, that there is an additional Hamil-
tonian matrix Hi such that H = H0 + εHi where ε is a small number. Since ε is
small, H0 and H are approximately equal, H0 ≈ H. We can then write the desired
eigenstates of H as superpositions (weighted sums of) of the eigenstates of H0 (which,
recall, we can calculate). Thus |ψa〉 = Σjcj|ψ0j 〉: where a labels the real Hamiltonian’s
eigenvalue (meaning just that H|ψa〉 = a|ψa〉); j labels the various eigenvalues of H0,
whose eigenstates are the |ψ0j 〉; and our task is to calculate the complex numbers cj.
It is these eigenstates of H0 that are called virtual states or virtual particles.
This jargon is especially used in quantum field theory, where the real Hamiltonian
is usually complicated enough to force us to appeal to perturbation theory. This
is a general framework for solving intractable problems by treating them as small
adjustments to tractable problems: e.g. by adding a term, εV say, where ε is a
small number and V a potential function, to the governing equations of the tractable
problem. One then tries to calculate the quantity of interest (in our example, one of
the cj) by expressing it as a power series Σ
∞
n α
nAn, where α is small, i.e. less than one,
so that αn → 0 as n → ∞. Here, α may be the original ε, or some related number.
The hope is that αn tending to 0 will make the terms αnAn for higher values of n
go to 0. If we are lucky, the first few terms of the series will give us an answer that
is accurate enough for our purposes; and if we are very lucky, the series may even
converge to the exact answer (i.e. the limit of the successive partial sums ΣNn α
nAn
is finite and is the exact answer). Whether these hopes are realized will of course
depend on the An not growing too quickly.
I should stress immediately that in quantum field theory, the success of this sort
of perturbative analysis is mixed. On the one hand, there is astounding success: in
some cases, in our best theories, the first few terms of such a series give an answer
that is astonishingly accurate. It matches the results of delicate experiments to as
much as ten significant figures, i.e. one part in 1010. That is like correctly predicting
the result of measuring the diameter of the USA, to within the width of a human hair!
For example, this accuracy is achieved by the prediction in quantum electrodynamics
of the magnetic moment of the electron; (Feynman 1985, pp. 6-7, 115-119; Schweber
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1994, p. 206f.; Lautrup and Zinkernagel 1999).
On the other hand, there are serious mathematical problems. It is not just that,
in general, the power series expressions we use, even in our best theories, are not
known to converge, and are sometimes known not to converge. There are two deeper
problems, which I have not yet hinted at.
The first concerns the mathematical definition of the interacting quantum field
theory, which our perturbative approach with its various power series is aiming to
approximate. Unfortunately, we do not at present have a rigorously defined interact-
ing quantum field theory, for a four-dimensional spacetime. There are such theories
for lower spacetime dimensions; and there has been much effort, and much progress,
towards the goal. But so far, it remains unattained. One brief way to put the chief
difficulty is to say that the central theoretical notion of a quantum field theory, the
path integral (also known as: functional integral)—which is what our power series
aim to approximate—has at present no rigorous mathematical definition, except in
special or simple cases such as there being no interactions.4
The second problem is related to the first; it indeed, it is part of it. But the second
problem specifically concerns the perturbative approach with its power series, and will
be centre-stage in this paper. So it is best stated separately. In short: not only do
the power series usually fail to converge; also, the factors An (in the successive terms
αnAn) are often infinite. Thus the worry that the An might ‘grow too quickly’ for the
power series to converge, as I put it above, was a dire under-statement. Nevermind An
being so large for large n that the series might diverge: the problem is really that each
term αnAn is infinite! This is quantum field theory’s notorious problem of infinities:
which, as we will see, is addressed by renormalization. Why the An are infinite, and
how renormalization addresses this by introducing a cut-off and then analysing what
happens when the cut-off tends to a limit, will be taken up in Section 2.3 et seq. For
the moment, I just confess at the outset that the overall problem of infinities will not
be fully solved by renormalization, even by the modern approach (Section 3). The
infinities will be tamed, even domesticated: but not completely eliminated.5
As an example of treating interactions in quantum theory using perturbation
theory, let us consider an electron immersed in, and so interacting with, an electro-
magnetic field. Here, the electron need not be described by a quantum field; it can
be described by elementary quantum mechanics; but we consider the electromagnetic
field to be quantized. We take it that we can solve the electron considered alone: that
is, we can diagonalize its Hamiltonian He say—this is essentially what Schro¨dinger
did in 1925. And we take it that we can solve the field considered alone: that is, we
can diagonalize its Hamiltonian Hf—this is essentially what Dirac did in 1927. But
the interaction means that the Hamiltonian of the total system, electron plus field, is
not just the (tractable!) sum of He and Hf , call it H0: H0 := He + Hf . In terms of
4For a glimpse of these issues, cf. e.g. Jaffe (1999, 2008), Wightman (1999).
5But that is perhaps unsurprising since, as I said, this second problem is part of the first. So if
it were fully solved, so might be the first problem also.
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eigenstates: the energy eigenstates of the total system are not just products of those
of the electron and the field; and so the total system’s energy eigenvalues are not just
sums of the individual eigenvalues.
But happily, the interaction is rather weak. We can write the total Hamiltonian
as H = H0 + εHi, where Hi represents the interaction and ε being a small number
represents its being weak; and then embark on a perturbative analysis. In particular,
we may expand an energy eigenstate in terms of the eigenstates of H0, which are each
a product of an electron eigenstate and field eigenstate: which latter are states with
a definite number of photons (i.e. excitations of the field). So according to the jargon
above: these photons will be called ‘virtual photons’.6 And as I stressed, the theory
that treats both the electron and the electromagnetic field as quantum fields which
interact with each other, i.e. the theory of quantum electrodynamics, is amazingly
empirically accurate. Such an accurate theory is surely getting something right about
nature: despite the issues about renormalization, to which we now turn (and some of
which, as we shall see later in the paper, are not yet resolved).
2.2.2 Energy scales
I said, just before Section 2.2.1, that this second aspect is more briefly stated than
the first, but is fundamental and will dominate the sequel. It amplifies the basic point
I announced at the start of Section 2: that while in classical physics, there seems no
problem about using the measured force felt by a test particle so as to calculate the
charge or mass (coupling constant) of the source, this straightforward approach fails
in quantum theory—we need to add complicated corrections.
Thus the general, or ideal, classical situation is that our theory says a measured
quantity, e.g. a force F on a test particle, is a function of the charge (coupling
constant) g of the source: F = F (g); (the function being given by our theory, as
in the electrostatic formula, F = −∇ − e/r). So the task if to measure F and
invert this equation to calculate g as a function of F : g = g(F ). But in quantum
field theory, this approach breaks down: perhaps unsurprisingly, since it amounts to
trying to characterize one aspect of an interacting many-field system in a way that
is comparatively simple and independent of the rest of the system: recall (iii) at the
start of this Section.
Broadly speaking, the corrections depend on the energy and-or momentum with
which the test particle approaches the source. A bit more exactly, recognizing that the
test particle and source are not conceptually distinguished, since e.g. they might both
be electrons: writing µ for the energy (or momentum) with which we theoretically
describe, or experimentally probe, the system, the corrections depend on µ.
So let us write g(µ) for the physical coupling constant, i.e. the coupling constant
that we measure: more exactly, the coupling constant that we calculate from what
6So NB: ‘virtual’ does not connote ‘illusory’, nor ‘merely possible’, as it does in the jargon of
‘virtual work’ etc. in classical mechanics—for which cf. Butterfield (2004).
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we actually measure, in the manner of g = g(F ) above, in the simple electrostatic
example. Then the notation registers that g(µ) is a function of µ. But also: it is a
function of the bare coupling constant, g0 say, that appears in the theory’s fundamental
equations (like e) in the electrostatic example). So we can write g(µ) ≡ g(µ, g0).
Using the details in Section 2.2.1 about virtual states and perturbation theory,
we can fill this out a bit. The Hamiltonians of our successful interacting quantum
field theories, such as quantum electrodynamics, are indeed intractable, because they
include terms (cf. Hi in Section 2.2.1) for interactions between the various fields,
e.g. the electron field and the electromagnetic field. So we often analyse problems
using perturbation theory, and in particular the eigenstates of the free Hamiltonian.
Similarly if we formulate our theories using the alternative Lagrangian, rather than
Hamiltonian, framework. The Lagrangian function (which is essentially a difference
of energy functions) is intractable, because it contains interaction terms; and so again,
we turn to perturbation theory.
Usually, for both frameworks and for most problems, perturbation theory yields,
as its approximate answer to the problem, a power series in the coupling constant, i.e.
Σng
nAn; or a power series in some closely related number. Note that getting a power
series in the coupling constant is unsurprising, given Section 2.2.1’s remark that one
often gets a power series in the parameter ε, which in the interaction term Hi = εV ,
looks like a coupling constant. Cf. Section 2.2.3 for some details.
Besides, as one would guess for a power series in the coupling constant: increasing
the exponent n from term to term corresponds to considering corrections which take
account of successively more interactions between the fields concerned. So the other
factor in each term, viz. An, encodes many ways that there can be n such interactions.
In particular as we will see in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3: it allows for these interactions
occurring in various places in space and time (by An being an integral over the
various places, typically over all of space between two times), and at various energies
and momenta (by integrating over energies and momenta).
Here we connect with the idea of Feynman diagrams. We think of the interactions
as occurring between particles, i.e. between excitations of the fields, and we represent
the idea that the interaction occurs at a point x in spacetime by drawing lines coming
from the past and reaching to the point, for the incoming particles, and lines from the
point towards the future, for the outgoing particles. So the point becomes a vertex of
a diagram of lines, and the diagram corresponding to the term gnAn will in general
have n vertices. Furthermore, since our perturbative analysis essentially involves
calculating eigenstates of the full interacting Hamiltonian by expanding them in states
of the free Hamiltonian: in the detailed calculation of the contribution gnAn made by
a single diagram, the internal lines represent propagations of virtual states/particles.7
7For some details, cf. e.g. Aitchison (1985: Sections 3.4-3.6, 5.3) and Feynman (1985, especially
pp. 115-122). They both discuss the phenomenon of vacuum polarization, and so screening: the
intuitive idea is that g(µ) will be greater at high energies because the test particle penetrates further
past the cloud of virtual particles that surround the source, and so “feels” a higher coupling constant.
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2.2.3 Some Details
By way of filling out Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, here are some details of elementary time-
dependent perturbation theory. This will be enough to suggest how in a quantum field
theory we often work with a power series in the coupling constant g; and to connect
a term of such a series with a Feynman diagram. (NB: nothing in this Subsection is
needed later, so it can be skipped!)
So suppose again that the full Hamiltonian H is H0 + Hi ≡ H0 + εV , where the
parameter ε is small, and we expand in powers of ε. We define the interaction picture
by
|ψ¯(t)〉 := exp(iH0t/~)|ψ(t)〉 ; V¯ (t) = exp(iH0t/~)V exp(−iH0t/~). (2.1)
so that the equation of motion of |ψ¯(t)〉 is
i~
d
dt
|ψ¯(t)〉 = εV¯ (t)|ψ¯(t)〉. (2.2)
We assume a solution is a power series in ε:
|ψ¯(t)〉 = Σ∞n=0 εn|ψ¯n(t)〉; (2.3)
with |ψ¯n(0)〉 = 0 if n > 0, since at t = 0 the state |ψ¯〉 is the initial state |ψ0〉
independent of ε.
Substituting the power series into the equation of motion and equating powers of
n gives a sequence of equations. The nth equation is:
i~
d
dt
|ψ¯n(t)〉 = V¯ (t)|ψ¯n−1(t)〉. (2.4)
These can be solved successively to give:
|ψ¯n(t)〉 = 1
(i~)n
∫ t
0
dtn
∫ tn
0
dtn−1 · · ·
∫ t2
0
dt1 V¯ (tn) · · · V¯ (t1) |ψ0〉. (2.5)
So
|ψ¯(t)〉 = Σn=0 ( ε
i~
)n
∫ t
0
dtn
∫ tn
0
dtn−1 · · ·
∫ t2
0
dt1 V¯ (tn) · · · V¯ (t1) |ψ0〉. (2.6)
Carrying this over to quantum field theory: in short, the factors V¯ (ti) are re-
placed by a product of field operators φ, at a spacetime point x, representing an
interaction between the fields at that point. So a factor replacing V¯ (ti) looks like
φˆ1(xi)φˆ2(xi)...φˆk(xi) to represent k different fields interacting at the spacetime point
In Section 3.2, we will see the opposite phenomenon, anti-screening or asymptotic freedom, where
g(µ) is a decreasing function of energy.
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xi. So increasing the exponent n from term to term in a power series in the coupling
constant, Σng
nAn, amounts to taking account of successively more interactions be-
tween the fields concerned. And in each term of the power series, the other factor,
viz. An, encodes many ways that there can be n such interactions. In particular, it
allows for these interactions:
(i) occurring in various places in space and time, by An being a n-fold multiple
integral over the spacetime points (xi, i = 1, ..., n): typically, an integral over all of
space between two times; and
(ii) occurring at various energies and momenta, by An integrating over various
possible energies and momenta of the interacting particles, especially the intermedi-
ate virtual particles.
As discussed above, the ideas in (i) and (ii) lead to Feynman diagrams.
2.3 The cut-off introduced
In the closing remark of Section 2.2.3, that An integrates over various possible ener-
gies and momenta, lurks the notorious problem of quantum field theory’s infinities:
the second problem of Section 2.2.1 which, as announced there, is addressed by renor-
malization.
Typically, An is a (multiple) integral) over energy or momentum k, extending from
some value, say k0 (maybe zero), upto infinity of a function that increases at least as
fast as a positive power of k, say ka. So An looks like
∫∞
k0
dk ka. If a > 0, this integral
is infinite; as k →∞, so does ka, for positive a, making the integral infinite.
So to get a finite answer from our formulas, we impose a cut-off: we replace the
upper limit in the integral, ∞, by a suitably high energy or momentum, written Λ.
(There are other ‘less crude’ ways to secure a finite answer—called regularizing the
integrals—but I will only consider cut-offs.)
I have introduced the cut-off as an energy Λ. But in quantum theory, energy is like
the reciprocal of distance; in the jargon, ‘an inverse distance’: energy ∼ 1/distance.
(And so distance is like an inverse energy.) This is due to the fundamental equations,
due to de Broglie, relating ‘particle’ and ‘wave’ properties: viz. that momentum p
is inversely proportional to wavelength λ with proportionality constant h. That is:
p = h/λ. (NB: λ and Λ are very different: an unfortunate notational coincidence,
but a widespread one ...) Wavelength is the number of units of length per complete
cycle of the wave. So writing k for the reciprocal, called wave-number, i.e. the
number of wave-cycles per unit-length, we have: p = hk. So high momenta (and high
energies) correspond to high wave-number, which means short wavelengths and high
frequencies.
So the cut-off energy Λ corresponds, in terms of distance, to a cut-off at a small
distance d. That is: imposing the cut-off, i.e. requiring by fiat that
∫∞
Λ
dk ... ≡ 0
means ignoring contributions to the integrand that vary on a distance shorter than d.
In other words: to get finite answers, we are declaring that the theory claims there
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are no fields varying on scales less than d. At least: any such fields do not contribute
to the specific process we are calculating. Or at least: the theory claims this, unless
and until we consider the limit d→ 0—which we will do in Section 2.4.
So returning to the notation of Section 2.2.2: the physical coupling constant, g(µ),
is a function, not only of the bare coupling constant g0 and of µ itself of course, but
also of the cut off d. Thus:
g(µ) ≡ g(µ, g0, d). (2.7)
So we can now state our task, introduced at the start of Section 2, more precisely.
We are to measure g(µ) (better: to calculate it from what we really measure, like
the force F in the simple electrostatics example) and then invert eq. 2.7, i.e. write
g0 = g0(g(µ), d), so as to calculate which value of the bare constant would give the
observed g(µ), at the given d. This task is the core idea of the traditional approach
to renormalization.
It is sometimes convenient, for the sake of uniformity, to express all dimensions in
terms of length. Section 2.6.1 will give more details. But for the moment, just note
that we can trade in the energy-scale µ for an inverse length, say µ ∼ 1/L where L is
a length. NB: L is not the cut-off d! We can think intuitively that L is experimental,
and d is theoretical. That is: L is our choice about how microscopically to describe or
probe—to peer into—the system. On the other hand, d is a (generally much smaller)
length below which we are taking our theory to say there are no contributions. So
we re-express the physical coupling constant g(µ) as a function of L: we will use the
same letter g for this function, so that we write g(L) ≡ g(µ). Thus eq. 2.7 becomes:
g(L) ≡ g(L, g0, d). (2.8)
In the next two sections, I turn to two further aspects of the task just described:
of inverting eq. 2.8 and assigning values to g0 that give the observed g(µ). These
aspects concern:
(i) letting d→ 0;
(ii) needing to allow for some extra terms in the equations: which will return
us to the analogy of the ping pong ball, at the start of Section 2.2.
2.4 Letting the cut-off d go to zero
Broadly speaking, the exact value of the cut-off d is up to us. Agreed: for some of
the troublesome infinities—some of the infinite terms An in perturbative analyses of
some problems—the physics of the problem will suggests a range of values of d that
are sensible to take. That is: the physics suggests that no phenomena on scales much
smaller than d will contribute to the process we are analysing. One such example,
very famous for its role in the establishment of quantum electrodynamics, is the Lamb
shift, where the electron’s Compton wavelength seems a natural lower limit to d; cf.
Aitchison (1985, Section 3.5-3.6), Schweber (1994, pp. 223-247).
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But of course, we would like the theory and its predictions to be independent of
any human choice. So generally speaking, it is natural to take d smaller and smaller,
at fixed µ; and to consider how g0 varies as a function of d, while preserving the
observed g(µ).
More precisely: if we believe that:
(a) spacetime is continuum, and
(b) our theory holds good in principle at arbitrarily short lengths,
then we surely also believe that at fixed µ (or at least at some, maybe theoretically
judicious or appropriate, µ: such as the observed µ), g0 goes to a limit: that is:
there exists lim
d→0;(g(µ) fixed at observed value)
g0 . (2.9)
We will later treat the issues that (i) since we can vary µ, there are various observed
values g(µ), and therefore (ii) whether we should require eq. 2.9 for all the observed
values g(µ). We will also treat letting µ go beyond the observed range, even letting it
go to infinity, although we cannot measure g(µ) above some technological (financial!)
maximum value of µ.
If the limit in eq. 2.9 exists and is finite, i.e. ∈ IR, we say: the theory is finite. As
the label suggests: in the face of the troublesome infinities, such a conclusion would
be a relief. But I should stress some limitations of this conclusion. There are three
obvious general ones; (cf. the references in footnote 4):
(i): this limit being finite does not imply that any of the power series which our
perturbative analysis provides for specific physical problems converges;
(ii): even if such a series, for a problem at a given value (or range) of µ, does
converge, this does not settle the behaviour of the corresponding series at other µ;
and that behaviour might be bad—in particular, arbitrarily high µ might produce a
troublesome infinity;
(iii): even if all goes well in a perturbative analysis, i.e. the various series converge
for the ranges of parameters for which we might hope, there remains a gap between
a perturbative analysis and the original physics problem or problems.
But even with these prospective limitations, some successful quantum field theories
are not finite. The paradigm case is QED. For QED, the limit in eq. 2.9 is infinite.
That is: for arbitrarily high cut-offs, the bare charge g0 is arbitrarily high (and
remains so for yet higher cut-offs). Mathematically, this is like elementary calculus
where we say that some function f(x) tends to infinity as x tends to infinity, e.g.
limx→∞
√
x = ∞. But of course this last is ‘just’ the infinity of pure mathematics.
But here we face (assuming (a) and (b) above) a physically real infinity viz. as the
value of the bare coupling constant.
The consensus, on the traditional approach to renormalization, is that this phys-
ically real infinity is acceptable. After all: since by construction we do not measure
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(nor calculate from measurements) the bare constant, we do not need to allow an
‘Infinity’ reading on our apparatus’ dials. To reflect this consensus, the adjective
‘renormalizable’, with its honorific connotations, is used. That is: If the limit in
eq. 2.9 exists, albeit perhaps being ±∞, we say the theory is renormalizable. So in
particular: QED is renormalizable in this sense, though not finite. (This definition of
‘renormalizable’ will be filled out in the next two subsections.)
But I should add that despite this consensus, most physicists would admit to some
discomfort that the bare constant should be infinite in the continuum theory that,
according to (a) and (b), we are thinking of as fundamental. Thus great physicists like
Dirac have been very uncomfortable (cf. the citations in Cao (1997, pp. 203-207));
and Feynman himself calls renormalization ‘a dippy process’ and ‘hocus-pocus’ (1985,
p. 128); (Teller (1989) is a philosophical discussion).
Besides, this discomfort does not depend on believing exactly (a) and (b) above.
Suppose that instead we merely believe the corresponding claims of possibility:
(a’) spacetime might be a continuum, and
(b’) our theory should be a consistent description (of the interactions in ques-
tion) at arbitrarily short lengths.
In short: we merely believe that our theory, formulated with a continuum spacetime
as background, is a “way the world could be”. Then we surely are committed to be-
lieving that at fixed µ (or at least some, maybe theoretically judicious or appropriate,
µ), g0 goes to a limit. And again, it is uncomfortable that this limit is infinity. Al-
though this yields, not an actual physical infinity, but only a possible physical infinity:
surely a philosopher should be uncomfortable at such a possibility. (Section 3.1.3 will
return to this, suggesting a way to ease the discomfort.)
But despite this discomfort, the fact remains that after facing the troublesome
infinities, it is obviously a great intellectual relief to find one’s theory to be renormal-
izable, even if not finite. It means we can succeed in our task: namely, to consistently
assign bare constants (albeit perhaps infinite ones) so as to recover the observed
physical coupling—and do so independently of the cut-off d we adopt so as to make
integrals finite.
This relief prompts the idea that even if one does not explicitly endorse (a) and (b)
(or perhaps, even (a’) and (b’)), one should adopt renormalizability as a reasonable
criterion for selecting theories. Thus the idea is: a good theory of whatever inter-
actions, should make sense, albeit perhaps with an infinite bare coupling constant,
when formulated with a continuum spacetime as background. This is indeed how
renormalizability was regarded in the traditional approach to renormalization, which
reigned ca. 1950 to 1970: acceptable theories should be remormalizable.
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2.5 The need for extra terms
The main issue in trying to write down a renormalizable theory is that we may need to
add (to the Lagrangian or Hamiltonian function) one or more terms to represent extra
interaction(s) between the fields, even though we believe the bare coupling constant
for the extra interaction(s) are zero. I first describe (i) the physical rationale for this;
and then (ii) the refinement it prompts in the definition of renormalizability, and
thereby in what the task of formulating a renormalizable theory involves.
2.5.1 The physical rationale
Thus suppose we think the bare coupling constant of some interaction is zero. That is,
we think that in our fundamental theory, a certain interaction—which would typically
be represented by some product of field operators—does not happen. Then we will be
tempted to have no term representing this interaction in our theory (as a summand
in our Lagrangian or Hamiltonian). For whatever the form, say F , of the interaction
(i.e. of the product of operators), we will think we can leave the term out of all
equations. For if g = 0 then the term g.F equals zero, and surely contributes nothing
to any equations.
But this might be a mistake! Despite the zero bare coupling, the interaction might
have a non-zero physical coupling constant at some scale µ; i.e. g(µ) 6= 0. Indeed,
this situation can arise not only for:
(a): the strength of a certain interaction between given fields; but also for
(b): the mass or charge of a given field, or as people say: the mass or charge of a
given particle (treated as an excitation of a field).
In case (b), we would be tempted to omit as pointless terms for all possible interactions
of the given field (particle) that depend on that mass or charge, since the terms are
apparently zero, and so surely contribute nothing to any equations. But this might
be a mistake: the physical coupling constant may be non-zero at some scale µ. In
such a case, we say: ‘the field (or particle) acquires a mass/charge at the scale µ’.8
The analogy of the ping pong ball, mentioned at the start of Section 2.2, may
help. There, the fact that it falls in a vacuum (or air) but is buoyant in water—
i.e. exhibits a positive gravitational mass in vacuum and air, but a negative one in
water—illustrated the general idea that the coupling constants associated to a system
can be altered by the medium in which the system is immersed. But now imagine the
ping pong ball is so light as to be massless in air, so that in air, it does not fall under
gravity but floats, weightless; yet when immersed in water, it ‘acquires a mass’ (in
fact a negative one, since it moves upwards, opposite to the force of gravity). Thus a
8Intuitively, case (b) seems more problematic than case (a): for the mass or charge of a given
field seems more “intrinsic” to it than is participation in a certain interaction with other fields, and
our habituation to mass and charge in classical physics makes us think such properties are “given”
prior to any interactions, rather than acquired from them.
16
system with g0 = 0 might have at some scale µ a non-zero physical coupling constant,
g(µ) 6= 0, which you could measure; (better: calculate from actual measurements).
So faced with this situation, whether case (a) or case (b): we should of course
include the corresponding term or terms in our fundamental equations. For recall
that our basic task is to find values of the bare constants that (at the given µ and d)
imply the measured values of g(µ). Here it will help to generalize the notation slightly
to reflect the fact that there are of course several, even many, coupling constants to
consider; as well as several, even many, possible interactions (terms in the Lagrangian
or Hamiltonian that are typically products of operators). So suppose that there are
in all N physical coupling constants, g1(µ), g2(µ), ...gN(µ), occurring in the various
terms/interactions in our theory. Then we cannot expect to have them implied by
less than N bare constants, even if we think some of the bare constants are zero.
After all, to fit N numbers, we expect to need N numbers.
2.5.2 A refined definition of renormalizability
So we now envisage a number N of different coupling constants; and we recognize
that we might have to allow extra terms for interactions, in particular those whose
bare couplings are zero (at least in the limit of greatest interest, viz. d → 0). This
suggests a more sophisticated, indeed more flexible, task than I stated before (cf.
after eq. 2.7 in Section 2.3). The task is still to assign bare constants so as to recover
the measured physical constants, and in particular so as to secure the limit in eq
2.9. But now we are allowed to add (if need be) extra terms: terms which can be
judiciously selected by us the theorist.
It seems reasonable to say that such extra terms are legitimate hypotheses to add
to our initial theory (our initial collection of terms), provided that all the terms taken
together, together with the limiting values of the bare constants given by eq 2.9,
imply the measured values of the various g(µ). After all: we have at least ‘saved the
phenomena’ with our theory formulated on a spacetime continuum, albeit perhaps
with the cost of judiciously selected extra terms. And this seems legitimate, even
if (as conceded in Section 2.4) some of the limiting values of the bare constants
are ∞. Indeed: this seems legitimate, even if some of the limiting values of the bare
constants in the new additional terms selected by us theorists are∞—even though we
originally motivated such terms by the case where the limiting value of the additional
bare constant is zero.9
In any case, whether or not you would call it ‘reasonable’: this is the consensus, on
the traditional approach to renormalization, under one proviso. Namely, that there
should be only a finite number of extra terms. The idea is: our theory should not qual-
9By focussing on renormalization, I have of course set aside the other requirements that the
theory must satisfy, if we are to talk of ‘legitimate hypotheses’ and ‘saving the phenomena’. To
include those requirements, I should of course add something like: ‘and provided that the theory is
otherwise empirically successful’.
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ify as ‘saving the phenomena’ if we have to make infinitely many such augmentations
to it. That is: a theory which secures the limit in eq 2.9, using either no extra terms,
or only a finite number of them, is given the honorific adjective: renormalizable.
2.6 Which theories are renormalizable?
I end this Section’s review of the traditional approach to renormalization by very
briefly reporting: (i) the criterion for when a theory is renormalizable, and (ii) that
our empirically successful quantum field theories satisfy this criterion. The good
fortune in (ii) will prompt the question: why should we be so lucky? Section 3 will
take up this question (using the criterion in (i)).
2.6.1 Dyson’s criterion
Suppose we focus, not on a whole theory as given by a Lagrangian or Hamiltonian,
i.e. by a sum of terms for the various sorts of energy of the various fields and their
various interactions; but on a single such term. If you like, we imagine a theory so
simple as to contain only one term. It turns out that the criterion for this theory, i.e.
term, to be renormalizable, can be simply stated.
To do so, we should first express all dimensions in terms of length. We saw in
Section 2.3 that, thanks to de Broglie’s relation p = h/λ, we can trade in a cut-off in
energy Λ for a distance d, and similarly the energy-scale µ for a distance L; with higher
energies corresponding to shorter distances, so that e.g. µ ∼ 1/L. (Recall that L is not
the cut-off d.) But it turns out that we can go much further: not only energy but all
quantities can be expressed as powers of length, by invoking the idea (due to Planck)
that two fundamental constants, such as the speed of light c and Planck’s constant h,
can be declared to be dimensionless, instead of (as usual) thinking of them as having
respectively dimensions ‘length divided by time’ and ‘length times momentum’. The
idea is that after making this declaration, we ‘back-calculate’ what dimension some
familiar quantity such as an electric charge must have, so that our equations come
out as dimensionally consistent. In this sort of way, a quantity turns out to have as
its dimension some power of length: it has dimension lengthD. Here, the power (also
called: exponent) D can be positive or negative. For example, L−1 ≡ 1/L, so that
with h declared dimensionless, de Broglie’s relation p = h/λ implies that momentum
has dimension length−1. For brevity, this is often shortened by dropping mention of
length, so that we say: ‘momentum has dimension -1’.
We can now state the criterion for a term (in the Lagrangian) to be renormalizable.
It turns out that this is so iff: the bare coupling constant which the term contains
has dimensions of lengthD, with D ≤ 0. This is called Dyson’s criterion, or the
power-counting criterion.
More precisely: suppose that the bare coupling constant g0 has dimensions of
lengthD. Then the corresponding physical coupling constant g(µ) ≡ g(L) will scale
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roughly like L−D. That is:
g(L)/g0 ∼ (L/d)−D (2.10)
Thus if D > 0, the exponent on the right-hand side will be negative; so when L is
very small, i.e. much smaller than d, the right hand side is very large. That is: the
physical coupling constant will be large compared with the bare one. That is a sign of
bad behaviour at small distances L, i.e. high energies. At least, it is bad in the sense
that the large coupling constant will prevent our treating the interaction represented
by the term as a small perturbation. Thus it is perhaps unsurprising that such a term
is non-renormalizable in the sense sketched informally at the end of Section 2.5.10
Eq. 2.10 will also be important in the modern approach to renormalization. To
anticipate a little: Section 3.1 will examine the case D > 0, i.e. non-renormalizability,
for large distances; L and Section 3.2 will examine the “happy” case of D ≤ 0, even
of small L.
2.6.2 Our good fortune
So much for the general ideas. How do the quantum field theories we “believe in”, or
“take seriously” fare? That is: are the theories which are our best descriptions of the
electromagnetic, weak and strong forces, renormalizable in the sense just discussed?
In short, they fare very well. For first: quantum electrodynamics (QED) is renor-
malizable in this Dyson sense. As to the other two forces: we have since the 1970s
had:
(i) a unified theory of the electromagnetic and weak forces (the electro-weak theory
of Weinberg and Salam; also called ‘(quantum) flavour-dynamics’ (QFD); and
(ii) a theory of the strong force (quantum chromodynamics, QCD).
(Like QED, these theories are so far defined only perturbatively; but unlike QED,
they each use a non-abelian gauge group: QFD uses SU(2) × U(1) and QCD uses
SU(3).) And indeed: both of these are renormalizable.
So all three—QED, QFD and QCD—are renormalizable. But we should recall
that all three theories are defined only perturbatively: recall that we do not have
a rigorously defined interacting quantum field theory in four spacetime dimensions
(Section 2.2.1), and that even a finite theory is defined only perturbatively and may
harbour divergent series (Section 2.4). Because of these limitations, a more mod-
est jargon is appropriate. So a qualifying adverb is often added to the honorific
‘renormalizable’. Namely, we say these three theories are perturbatively/superficially
renormalizable.
It seems a piece of great good fortune that our best theory of some force of nature
be renormalizable (even perturbatively): let alone our theories of three such forces.
At least, it is a relief after (a) having to admit that we can so far only define the
theory perturbatively, and (b) having to face, from Section 2.1 onwards, complicated
10This bad behaviour is not to say that a non-renormalizable theory is mathematically inconsistent:
e.g. the Gross-Neveu model is non-renormalizable.
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corrections: a relief that the theory can in the above sense ‘save the phenomena’,
even if it is not finite in Section 2.4’s sense.
But we will now see that according to the modern approach to renormalization,
this great good fortune is not so surprising. In a certain sense, renormalizability is
generic at the low-ish energy scales we can access—cf. the next Section.
3 The modern approach to renormalization
The key initial idea of this approach, initiated in the mid-1960s by the work of Wilson,
Fisher, Kadanoff and others (with important earlier work by e.g. Stueckelberg, Gell-
Mann and Low) is that instead of being concerned with good limiting behaviour as
the cut-off d → 0, we instead focus on how g(µ) varies with µ. In terms of the ping
pong ball analogy at the start of Section 2.2, and Section 2.2.2’s discussion of energy
scales: we now focus, not on regularizing integrals with a cut-off d, but on how the
parameters of a system, e.g. the mass of a ping pong ball, depend on the energy or
momentum scale at which we describe it.
Indeed, if we envisage a number of coupling constants, say N for N possible
interactions, then the “vector” of coupling constants (g1(µ), ..., gN(µ)) represents a
point in an N -dimensional space; and as µ varies, this point flows through the space.
And accordingly: if we envisage a theory as given by a Lagrangian (or Hamiltonian)
which is a sum of terms representing different possible interactions, then this space is
a space of theories. Jargon: we say the coupling constants run, and the flow is called
the renormalization group flow.
As we shall see, this simple idea leads to a powerful framework. I shall first (Section
3.1) report how it explains why a theory (like QED) that concerns phenomena at the
low (or low-ish!) energy scales that we can access, is renormalizable. That is: it
explains why the good fortune noted in Section 2.6.2 is generic. Then in Section
3.2, I discuss high-energy, i.e. short-distance, behaviour. Finally, I discuss insights
about the renormalization group that come from thinking about statistical mechanics
(Section 3.3). All three Subsections will introduce some jargon, indeed “buzz-words”,
such as (respectively): fixed points, asymptotic freedom and universality.
3.1 Good fortune explained: non-renormalizable terms dwin-
dle at longer distances
To explain “our good fortune” in the sense introduced in Section 2.6.2 is to explain
why a theory about phenomena at the low, or moderate, energy scales that we can
access should be renormalizable. There are of course various philosophical controver-
sies about explanation. But I take it to be uncontroversial that one very satisfying
way to explain this would be to show: not merely that some given theory is renor-
malizable; but that any theory, or more modestly, any of a large and-or generic class
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of theories, is renormalizable. To the extent that the class of theories is indeed large
and-or generic, such an argument would demonstrate that our good fortune was “to
be expected”. (Admittedly, such an explanation, whether for a single theory, or for a
class of them, will have to make some other assumptions about the theory or theories:
a point I will stress in Section 3.1.1. So it is only relative to those assumptions that
the good fortune is explained, and to be expected.)
This is indeed what the modern approach to renormalization gives us, with its
idea of a space of theories, on which there is a flow given by varying the energy-
scale µ. More precisely and modestly, but also more practically: I admit that this
approach does not show that any of a large and-or generic class of theories has, at
the comparatively low energies and large length-scales we can access, literally no
non-renormalizable terms. Rather, the approach shows that for any such theory—
“with whatever high-energy behaviour, e.g. non-renormalizable terms, you like”—the
non-renormalizable terms dwindle into insignificance as energies become lower and
length-scales larger. That is, in Section 2’s notation: the physical coupling constant
for non-renormalizable terms shrinks. For such terms: as µ → 0 (i.e. L → ∞),
g(µ) ≡ g(L) → 0.
Indeed, this explanation is already clear from Section 2.6.1’s discussion of eq. 2.10:
which, to repeat it, was:
g(L)/g0 ∼ (L/d)−D (3.1)
In Section 2.6.1, we focussed on the case where L is very small, so that a non-
renormalizable term’s positive exponent (in the dimension of length) makes for a
large physical coupling constant. But just look at the other side of the same coin.
When L is large (much larger than the cut-off d), and D > 0 (i.e. the term in
question is non-renormalizable), then the right hand side of eq. 3.1 is very small.
That is: the physical coupling constant is very small. So at large distances, the non-
renormalizable interaction is weak: “you will not see it”.
There are four main points I should make about this explanation, before discussing
short-distance behaviour (Section 3.2). The first point is about how non-trivial the
explanans, i.e. eq. 3.1, is. The second point is about the explanation not depending
on spacetime being a continuum. This will prompt the third point, about effective
theories. (The second and third points, in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, correspond to
Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of the companion paper (2014).) The fourth point will some-
what generalize the discussion, from a physical not philosophical viewpoint; and will
introduce some more jargon.
3.1.1 Decoupling high-energy behaviour
That at large distances, a non-renormalizable interaction is weak follows immediately
from eq. 3.1. But that does not make it obvious! A good deal of theory needs to be
assumed in order to deduce eq. 3.1. After all, there is of course no a priori guarantee
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that interactions that are strong at short distances should be weak at long distances.
To show this “decoupling” of high-energy behaviour from the low-energy behaviour
was a major achievement of Wilson, the other authors mentioned, and indeed many
other physicists, e.g. Symanzik (1973), Applequist and Carazzone (1975). I will not
go into details, but just make three general remarks.
(i): It can be shown under very general conditions, even within the confines of a
perturbative analysis.
(ii): Looking ahead: Section 3.1.3 will mention Weinberg’s perspective, based on
a result roughly to the effect that, even without assuming the framework of quantum
field theory ab initio, any relativistic quantum theory’s description of physics at low
enough energies must look like the description given by a quantum field theory.
(iii): Again, looking ahead: Section 3.2 will say a bit more about how the limiting
high-energy behaviour of g(µ) is encoded in a function, the beta-function, which can
be calculated perturbatively.
3.1.2 Spacetime need not be a continuum
Notice that this explanation does not depend on our theory (with all its terms, includ-
ing non-renormalizable ones) being true, or even approximately true, at arbitrarily
short distances. It only needs to be approximately true at suitable intermediate
distances. More precisely: it only needs to secure eq. 3.1 holding for any non-
renormalizable interaction at a range of scales which is wide enough to include L
being sufficiently larger than the cut-off d, so that with the given positive dimension
D of the bare coupling constant, the left hand side of eq. 3.1 is small enough that we
will not see the interaction.
We can put the same point in more physical terms, and in terms of energies. Maybe
at very high energies, spacetime does not behave like a continuum. But provided the
theory is “true enough” at some high, maybe even inaccessible, energies in the sense
that it validates eq. 3.1, then we can deduce that at much lower, in particular
accessible, energies, “we see only renormalizable interactions”. That is: our theory’s
predictions have significant contributions only from renormalizable interactions.
Note incidentally that this independence of spacetime being a continuum is much
stronger than we saw before, in the shift in Section 2.4, from assuming (a) and
(b) to assuming (a’) and (b’): roughly, the shift from assuming that our theory
described physics in a continuous spacetime to assuming merely that it might do so.
In the present argument, we could be agnostic about whether, or even deny that, our
theory could describe physics in a continuous spacetime. All we need is that it is
approximately true at suitable intermediate distances, as just specified.
Here we meet a widespread jargon. A theory that is taken to be approximately
true in a given regime (of energy and-or length, and-or some other parameters) is
called effective. The adjective is used especially when the theory is known or believed
to be only approximately true; say, because it is derived using certain approximating
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and-or idealizing assumptions (assumptions which go beyond merely specifying the
regime, i.e. range of parameters, concerned).
So we can sum up the above explanation of what I called ‘our good fortune’
by saying: from studying the renormalization group flow, we deduce (subject to the
theoretical assumptions gestured at in Section 3.1.1) that effective low-energy theories
are renormalizable. The idea of effective theories leads in to the next point.
3.1.3 Effective theories only?
I ended Section 2.4 by reporting that on the traditional approach, renormalizability
functioned as a criterion for selecting theories. But the explanation at the start of
Section 3.1 undermines this stance. For it says that, although non-renormalizable
terms induce bad behaviour, i.e. a large coupling, at short distances, this bad be-
havour is invisible at the larger distances we can access. So why worry? That is: why
not countenance non-renormalizable terms, at least for inaccessibly high energies?
Of course, the words ‘worry’ and ‘countenance’ are vague. What you are inclined
to worry about, and correspondingly what you are willing to countenance, will depend
on your background attitudes to quantum field theory: for example, on how confident
you are about using it at high energies, and about accepting results obtained from
a heuristic formalism, rather than by rigorous mathematical proofs. So there are
bound to be several possible positions. Here I will briefly develop one position, often
called the effective field theory programme (or: approach). It is based, not so much
on confidence about the two topics above, as on an opportunistic or instrumentalist
attitude to being unconfident about them. (In Section 3.2, I will describe a less
opportunistic or instrumentalist attitude, based on results showing some quantum
field theories’ good behaviour at arbitrarily short distances.)
There are of course two main factors that prompt a cautious or sceptical attitude
towards the framework of quantum field theory.
(1): One is just that interacting quantum field theories (in four spacetime dimen-
sions) are at present mathematically ill-defined. Recall that this was the first of the
two serious mathematical problems listed in Section 2.2.1.
(2): The other factor is the expectation that at sufficiently high energies, the
framework breaks down, to be replaced by a theory or theories using a different
framework. This break-down might occur only at the vast energies associated with
quantum gravity: the replacement theory being perhaps a version of string theory,
or some other current contender for a theory of quantum gravity. Or the break-down
might occur at intermediate energies, energies far higher than we can (and probably:
ever will) access, but well below those of quantum gravity: there are proposals for
new frameworks at these energies, such as non-commutative geometry.
Either or both of these factors prompt one to be cautious about drawing from
quantum field theory conclusions about ontology. Or rather: conclusions about the
ontology of phenomena at very high energies, or very short distances. But these
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factors should not suspend all discussion of ontology in the light of physics, or even
in the light of quantum field theory; for three reasons.
(a): Whatever the phenomena at very high energies turn out to be, whatever the
theoretical framework for describing them, and whatever ontology that framework
suggests, we have every reason to expect that the facts at those energies determine
(in philosophical jargon: subvene) the facts at the lower energies we can access.
(b): And given the great success of quantum field theory, we have every reason
to expect that the facts at those very high energies imply a quantum field theoretic
description at the lower, accessible, energies.
(c): Besides, whoever said that ontology concerns only “the supervenience basis”,
i.e. the putative set or level of facts that determine (subvene) all other facts? That is:
there is plenty of scope for ontological discussion of supervening (“higher level”) facts
and theories: in particular, there is scope for for ontological discussion of quantum
field theory.
But these factors also suggest that even below the energy scale at which the
entire framework of quantum field theory breaks down, there may, for all we know,
not be any single quantum field theory which is more fundamental than the others,
in the sense that each of them is derived from it by assuming extra conditions that
specify the derived theory’s regime (of energies and types of interaction considered
etc.). That is: as the energy scale gets higher and higher (while remaining below the
scale at which the entire framework of quantum field theory breaks down), physics
might be described by a succession of quantum field theories, each of which accurately
describes the phenomena at a certain range of energies, but becomes inaccurate above
that range. And when it becomes inaccurate, it may also become even more badly
behaved, mathematically.
This scenario is often called the tower of effective field theories. But the phrase
can be misleading, for two complementary reasons.
(i): First, as I mentioned when defining ‘effective’, at the end of Section 3.1.2: the
adjective is often used when the theory is known or believed to be only approximately
true, because it is derived using approximating and-or idealizing assumptions. But in
this scenario, the theories in the envisaged tower are not required to be derivable from
some other theory: in particular, one with greater credentials, or warrant, for being
taken as exactly true (‘fundamental’) because it also covers higher energies. Rather,
each theory is simply accurate in its energy range, and inaccurate beyond it.
(ii): Second: the word ‘tower’ suggests an infinite tower. But as I noted in (1)
above, there are good reasons (concerning quantum gravity if nothing else) to think
that at some energy, the entire framework of quantum field theory breaks down.
So as a programme or approach for quantum field theory, the effective field theory
programme can, and should, admit that the tower is probably finite.
But setting aside misleading connotations: the main point is that this scenario
gets some support from this Section’s explanation of “our good fortune”, viz. that any
non-renormalizable interactions (terms), though they would be important at higher
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energies, will make a dwindling contribution to all processes, as the energy scale is
reduced. For this explanation implies that we cannot get evidence about which non-
renormalizable interactions, if any, operate at inaccessibly high energies. Whatever
they are—and whatever the bad short-distance behaviour they suffer (cf. the end
of Section 2.6.1)—we will not see them. So why worry about non-renormalizable
interactions (terms)? And for all we know, or could ever know, the scenario of the
tower holds good: there is no fundamental quantum field theory, and various such
interactions operate at various inaccessibly high energies.
There is a further, and substantial, point to make. So far, my exposition of the
effective field theory scenario has had the spirit of epistemic modesty: “for all we
know”. A true and worthy sentiment, if a bit dull. But Weinberg has developed
a stronger and more positive perspective on the matter. It provides an answer to
the question why physics at accessible energies should be described by a quantum
field theory at all, even if the framework breaks down higher up, e.g. because of
gravity. And this answer yields the narrative strategy for his magisterial exposition
of quantum field theory (1995; cf. pp. xx-xxi, 1-2, 31-38; 1999 pp. 242-247). In short,
there is the following result; (admittedly, with ‘result’ understood by the standards
of heuristic quantum field theory, not pure mathematics). Any quantum theory that
at low enough energies is Lorentz-invariant and satisfies one other main assumption,
called ‘cluster decomposition’ (which is plausible, since it has the flavour of a locality
assumption), must at low enough energies be a quantum field theory (1999, p. 246).
So much by way of sketching the effective field theory programme. We can sum it
up as urging that, regardless of how and why quantum field theory might break down
at very high energies (as it presumably does, thanks to gravity, if nothing else): we
have no reason in theory, nor experimental data, to deny the scenario of the tower—
a succession of theories, each accurately describing physics in its energy range, and
inaccurate beyond it.
As I said at the start of this Subsection, this suggests a rather opportunistic or
instrumentalist attitude to quantum field theories. I will return to this briefly at the
start of Section 4. Meanwhile, in Section 3.2, I will describe how results showing
some quantum field theories’ good behaviour at arbitrarily high energies foster a less
opportunistic or instrumentalist attitude. More precisely: the results suggest that
there are good prospects that these theories can be rigorously defined (pace (1) above).
3.1.4 The renormalization group flow
So far, my talk of the renormalization group flow has been restricted in three ways;
which we need to overcome. The most important is that we need to consider, not
just the flow as energy µ decreases (length L increases), but also the flow in the other
direction: as µ increases (L decreases). This needs a separate subsection: Section 3.2.
Here I overcome two smaller restrictions: this will also introduce more jargon.
(a): A flow can have a fixed point, i.e. a point that is not moved by the flow:
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think of sources and sinks in elementary discussions of fluid flow. In our context (the
renormalization group flow), this would mean a set of physical coupling constants
(g1(µ), ..., gN(µ)) that is unchanged as µ decreases further (as the length-scale in-
creases further). Jargon: the behaviour of the system is scale-invariant: “you see the
same behaviour/theory/physical coupling constants, at many different length-scales”.
This can indeed happen; and we will see a vivid physical reason for this, related to
statistical mechanics, in Section 3.3. Such a point is called an infra-red fixed point.
Here, ‘infra-red’ is used on analogy with light: infra-red light has a longer wavelength,
lower frequency and lower energy, than visible light.
(b): So far, we have had in mind one trajectory, maybe leading to a fixed
point. But many trajectories might lead to the same fixed point; or at least enter and
remain in the same small region of the space. If so, then the ‘vectors’ (g1(µ), ..., gN(µ))
at diverse early points on a pair of such trajectories representing dissimilar theories
lead, as µ decreases, to the same fixed point, or at least to the same small region,
and so to similar theories. That is: when you probe at low energies/long distances,
“you see the same physical coupling constants/behaviour/theory”. Jargon: This is
called universality. And the set of ‘vectors’ that eventually lead, as µ decreases, to
the given fixed point is called, on analogy with elementary discussions of fluid flow,
the point’s basin of attraction. But note that universality should really be called
‘commonality’ or ‘similarity’: for there can be different fixed points, each with their
own basin of attraction. But jargon aside: Section 3.3 will give more physical details
about universality, and Section 4.3 will assess whether it is different from the familiar
philosophical idea of multiple realizability.
Finally, we can summarize this Subsection’s main point, that non-renormalizable
interactions dwindle at large length-scales, by combining the jargon we have just
introduced with the previous jargon that a free theory is a theory with no interactions.
Namely: the infra-red fixed points of theories all of whose terms are nonrenormalizable
are free theories.
3.2 Short-distance behaviour: the beta-function and asymp-
totic freedom
Instead of considering the flow as energy µ decreases (length L increases), we can of
course consider flowing in the other direction: as µ increases (L decreases). Again,
the jargon is borrowed from light: we can consider the flow towards the ultra-violet.
Looking again at eq. 3.1 (which is eq. 2.10), we see that it is terms/interactions for
which D < 0 for which the physical coupling constant goes to zero as L → 0; since
for these terms, the physical coupling constant scales like L to a positive power.
Of course, the coupling constant being zero means the interaction is not “seen”
(cf. Section 2.5.1). The behaviour we see is that of the free, i.e. non-interacting,
theory. This is called asymptotic freedom. And as in (a) in Section 3.1.4, this free
theory may be fixed, i.e. not moved, by the flow. If so, it is an ultra-violet fixed point.
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On the other hand, if D = 0, then according to eq. 3.1, the physical coupling
constant scales like L to the zeroth power; that is, it is constant. More precisely: we
need to study the range under which eq. 3.1, or some more precise equation, is valid,
and what happens to the physical coupling constant(s) beyond that range.
So these cases, D < 0 and D = 0, are very different; accordingly, there is jargon
to distinguish them. Recall that in Section 2.6.1, we called a term for which D ≤ 0
‘renormalizable’. But we now distinguish the two cases. If D < 0 (the “happy case”),
we say the theory is super-renormalizable. If D = 0, we say the theory is (“merely”)
renormalizable. But if in this latter case, a more subtle analysis shows that the
coupling constant goes to zero as L→ 0, we will still say the theory is asymptotically
free. That is: this buzz-word is not reserved for super-renormalizable theories.
We can summarize, using the jargon we have just introduced, like we did at
the end of Section 3.1.4. Namely: asymptotically free theories, in particular super-
renormalizable theories, have a free theory as an ultra-violet fixed point.
Note that the idea of a ultra-violet fixed point is more general than asymptotic
freedom, in that the renormalization group flow could have a non-free theory as an
ultra-violet fixed point. The various possibilities for what happens to g(µ) as µ tends
to infinity are often described in terms of the beta-function, which is defined by
β(g) :=
dg
d lnµ
≡ µdg
dµ
. (3.2)
Here lnµ is the logarithm of µ. So the β-function is the rate of increase of g with
respect to a logarithmically damped measure lnµ of the energy: since logarithm rises
very slowly, it is in effect an amplified rate of increase of g with respect energy—
amplified by multiplying by the energy itself.
So as µ tends to infinity, there are three possibilities for g(µ) having a finite
limit, i.e. an ultra-violet fixed point. Since there is a fixed point, all will involve
limµ→∞ β = 0. But g might have zero as its limit (as discussed: asymptotic freedom).
Or g might have some non-zero value g? as its limit. This is called asymptotic safety.
Or g might be a constant, g? say, independent of µ; so that g does not, colloquially
speaking, tend to a limit—it is already there. This situation occurs in theories which
are conformally invariant.11
To summarize, the three possibilities for g(µ) having a finite limit at short dis-
tances are:
(a): asymptotic freedom: limµ→∞ β = 0; limµ→∞ g = 0;
(b): asymptotic safety: limµ→∞ β = 0; limµ→∞ g = g? 6= 0.
(c): conformal invariance: β ≡ 0 i.e. g is constant, independent of µ.
Compare Figure 1; where the ultra-violet fixed point is the dot. In Fig. 1(a), as µ
11This means, roughly speaking, that the theory is symmetric under any change of scale (a di-
lation). This extra symmetry makes conformally invariant theories easier to study in various ways
(especially if spacetime has only one spatial dimension); and thus important to us, even though they
do not describe the known forces.
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grows the negative β drives g down to 0. In Fig. 1(b), as µ grows, a positive β drives
g up towards the fixed point, while a negative β drives it down. Finally in Fig. 1(c),
g is constant independent of µ.12
Figure 1: UV fixed points
So much for the general ideas. Let us ask, as we did in Section 2.6.2: How do
the quantum field theories which are our best descriptions of the electromagnetic,
weak and strong forces, get classified? There, we reported that all three (i.e. QED,
QFD and QCD) are renormalizable—in that Section’s inclusive sense, that D ≤ 0:
i.e. D < 0 or D = 0. More exactly, they are perturbatively renormalizable, since as
emphasized there, the theories have not yet been rigorously defined.
Now that we distinguish the two cases, D < 0 vs. D = 0, there is: bad news
and good news—indeed, there are two pieces of each. First, the bad news: (that is,
in addition to the prevailing lack of rigour). First: None of the theories is super-
renormalizable. They are “merely” renormalizable; so we need a more subtle analysis
of their short-distance behaviour. Because the three theories are only defined pertur-
batively, it is hard to make such an analysis. But there is every reason to believe that
for QED, there is more bad news; (this is the second piece of bad news). Namely:
QED’s is badly behaved at short distances. That is: in QED, as L decreases, the
coupling constant, i.e. the charge of the electron, at first looks constant—but it then
grows and grows. There is good reason to think it tends to infinity, as L→ 0.
On the other hand: for QCD, the corresponding analysis yields good news—good
short-distance behaviour. That is: There is every reason to believe that QCD is
asymptotically free. So at very short distances, quarks do not feel each other’s weak
or strong force.13 Besides, there may be some good news about gravity. In this paper,
12My thanks to Nazim Bouatta for Figure 1, and for teaching me most of this Section. Of course,
one can give a more fine-grained classification than Figure 1’s (a)-(c): cf. e.g. the options in
Weinberg (1995a, Section 18.3, p. 130f.).
13Wilczek’s Nobel lecture (2005) is a beautiful and masterly introduction to asymptotic freedom,
especially in QCD. QFD is, unfortunately, not asymptotically free. Its high energy behaviour is
complicated: for details cf. e.g. Horejsi (1996), Moffat (2010); thanks to Nic Teh for these references.
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I have of course ignored gravity, apart from saying in Section 3.1.3 that people expect
quantum gravity to force a breakdown of quantum field theory. One main reason
for that is the fact that the quantum field theory obtained by quantizing general
relativity is not renormalizable: and thereby, on Section 2’s traditional approach, not
acceptable. But there is evidence that this theory is asymptotically safe, i.e. that
the physical coupling constant has a finite limit at high energies, case (b) above;
(Weinberg 1979, Section 3, p. 798f).
This good news prompts a broader point, which was foreshadowed at the end of
Section 3.1.3’s discussion of effective theories. Namely, asymptotic freedom suggests
these theories can be rigorously defined. This is not to suggest that success is over the
next hill: if attainable, it is some way off—but asymptotic freedom gives us grounds
for optimism.14 If so, this would count against the effective field theory vision, that
(regardless of gravity) there is a succession of theories, each accurately describing
physics in its energy range, but inaccurate beyond it.
3.3 The perspective from the theory of condensed matter
No account of the modern approach to renormalization, however brief, would be
complete without some discussion of the role therein of ideas from the theory of
condensed matter. (‘Condensed matter’ is short for ‘liquid or solid’.) Ideas from this
field have been invaluable. To convey something of these insights, I shall make just
three main points: that continuous phase transitions correspond to infra-red fixed
points of the renormalization group flow (Section 3.3.1); that renormalization group
methods enable us to calculate correctly the critical exponents of such transitions
(Section 3.3.2); and finally, that in a condensed matter system, there is a natural
lower limit to the cut-off d and length L (Section 3.3.3).15
At the outset, I should clarify my usage. I will contrast ‘theory of condensed
matter’, with ‘quantum field theory’, understood as I have done hitherto in this
paper: viz. as describing high energy physics, especially the fundamental forces—
electromagnetism, the weak force and the strong force. But I stress that the mathe-
matics of quantum field theory is used endemically to describe condensed matter. For
example, one often describes a solid or liquid with a quantum field (say: energy or
momentum, or electric field): this amounts to assigning a quantum operator to each
point of space or spacetime—thus abstracting away from the atomic constitution of
matter. I will briefly return to this in Section 3.3.3.
14Besides, we can show that if a theory rigorously exists, then its asymptotic freedom can be
ascertained perturbatively: so there is no threat of future success undermining our present grounds
for optimism. For this pleasant surprise, cf. Gross (1999, p. 571).
15Condensed matter is, fortunately, more familiar than quantum fields. Among many approachable
references for this material, let me pick out just Kadanoff’s masterly surveys (2009, 2013), Batterman
(2010), and Menon and Callender (2013).
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3.3.1 Continuous phase transitions: scale-invariance
In both classical and quantum physics, understanding condensed matter is usually
harder than understanding gases, since the mutual proximity of the atoms makes
for stronger interactions, and so for problems that are harder to solve (cf. Section
2.2.1’s discussion of intractable Hamiltonians). So it is little wonder that most of the
early successes of statistical mechanics—which is the core theory for understanding
condensed matter—concerned gases. But the last half-century has seen great strides
in understanding liquids and solids, in both classical and quantum physics.
Most relevant to us is the topic of phase transitions. These are transitions between
macroscopically distinguishable states (also called: phases), such as the liquid, solid
or gaseous states themselves. So melting and freezing, boiling and condensing, are
all phase transitions; but so is the change in the direction of magnetization of some
material, under the influence of a changing magnetic field. Here, I will consider only a
special kind of phase transition, called continuous or second-order, or a critical point.
The idea is that in such a phase transition, the material “looks the same” at whichever
length scale you examine it (scale-invariance): this phenomenon of scale-invariance
does not occur in the more usual first-order phase transitions.
Thus consider water boiling, i.e. liquid water being heated and becoming steam.
Usually—for example in a kettle—the phase transition is first-order: there is a body
of water that is almost entirely liquid but for a few bubbles of steam rising in it,
and a body of steam (and air), but for a few droplets of liquid water. If we think of
the density as the quantity whose varying values encode the difference between the
phases, liquid and solid, there is no scale-invariance. For the two regions where liquid
and gas predominate are separated by the bubbling surface; and besides, on a smaller
scale, the bubbles of steam in the liquid (and the droplets of water in the gas) have
some characteristic mean size (and variance).
But there is a special temperature and pressure, called the critical point, at which
the distinction between liquid water and steam breaks down, and there is scale-
invariance. That is: scrutinizing a volume of liquid water, we see that it contains
bubbles of steam of widely varying sizes in roughly equal proportions; and scrutiniz-
ing such a bubble, we see that it contains yet smaller droplets of water, which are
themselves of widely varying sizes in roughly equal proportions; and if we scrutinize
one of those droplets, we find it contains yet smaller bubbles ... and so on, through
many orders of magnitude of size, until we reach molecular dimensions, where, of
course, the alternation between the phases breaks down.16
Thus the critical point involves a “tower of self-similarity”, where zooming in to see
finer detail presents the same picture as we saw at larger length-scales. More precisely:
it presents the same sort of picture, in a statistical sense. That is: the exact position,
16This critical point for water happens at a temperature of 374 degrees Celsius (647 = 374 + 273
degrees Kelvin). The water-steam mixture takes on a cloudy appearance so that images are blurred;
and thus the phenomenon is called ‘critical opalescence’. As we will see in Section 3.3.2, it also
happens for other liquid-gas mixtures.
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size and other properties of the bubbles of steam, at any level, is of course a matter
of myriadly complicated happenstance. But the statistical properties of the bubbles
at different levels match, in the sense that: if we specify the degree of magnification
(zooming in: the change of length-scale) between two levels, there is a corresponding
re-scaling of the bubbles’ other quantities, such as expected size, density etc., which
maps the means and variances of bubbles’ quantities at the first level to those at
the second. In short: there is statistical self-similarity, under changes of length-scale,
through many orders of magnitude, until we reach molecular dimensions.
Many other phase transitions, in many other materials, can occur in this curious,
statistically self-similar, way in which the idea of a boundary between the phases
breaks down; (unsurprisingly, this requires special external conditions, like tempera-
tures, pressures etc.). For example, it can happen in a magnet. The analogue to the
alternation between bubbles of steam and droplets of liquid water is the alternation
between the magnetization in two different spatial directions, for example “up” and
“down”. At the critical point (requiring a special temperature, the Curie temper-
ature), a region of the magnet with magnetization predominantly up turns out to
contain “islands” whose magnetization is predominantly down, but each such island
contains contain islands whose magnetization is predominantly up ... and so on.
We can already see how the idea of a critical point connects with several of the
notions in Section 3.1, especially the renormalization group flow, infra-red fixed points
and universality (Section 3.1.4). Zooming out our description of a system to longer
distances corresponds to flowing to lower energies (decreasing µ) in a quantum field
theory. Scale-invariance means that the description does not change as we zoom
out further. So such a description corresponds to an infra-red fixed point of the
renormalization group flow.
Furthermore, we can strengthen my phrase ‘corresponds to’ to is, if we make the
notion of ‘description’ of the condensed matter system more precise as the set of
physical coupling constants that occur in the Hamiltonian that describes the system
at the distance-scale concerned. (Similarly, with Lagrangian instead of Hamiltonian;
but for short, I will just say ‘Hamiltonian’.)
That is: we can set up the idea of a space of theories of condensed matter sys-
tems, and a flow on this space, just as we did at the start of Section 3. Given a
postulated microscopic Hamiltonian describing the atomic or molecular interactions,
the zooming out process is then a matter of successively coarse-graining the descrip-
tion, i.e. defining collective variables, to give an effective Hamiltonian. The standard
example, viz. the Ising model, is very intuitive. The system is a regular array of sites
(in one or more dimensions: a line or a lattice); with each of which is associated a
variable taking one of two values, +1 or -1. The microscopic Hamiltonian encodes
the idea that equal values for neighbouring spins are “preferred” (i.e. have lower
energy). One coarse-grains by taking a majority vote of the values in a block of,
say, ten spins; thus defining a new array, with ten times fewer sites, described by
a new effective Hamiltonian. One then defines a flow on the space of Hamiltonians
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by iterating this coarse-graining; for details, cf. the maestro’s exposition (Kadanoff
2013, Section 6.4, p. 170-172). Thus a Hamiltonian that is unchanged by zooming
out, i.e. is scale-invariant, is precisely an infra-red fixed point of this flow.
Finally, note that the notion of universality carries over directly to the context
of condensed matter physics. It means that two disparate physical systems, with
very different microscopic Hamiltonians, can be described at long length-scales in
the same way. (This of course sounds exactly like philosophers’ notion of multiple
realizability: cf. Section 4.3.) Indeed: if the two microscopic Hamiltonians flow to
the same infra-red fixed point, then the two systems are described at their respective
critical points, by the very same Hamiltonian. (And similarly, for descriptions in the
neighbourhood of the critical point: the descriptions of the two systems are close but
not identical.) Having the same Hamiltonian can make the two systems have exactly
equal values for corresponding quantities. This quantitative equality, despite very
disparate microscopic constitutions, can be very striking—as we will see in the next
Subsection.
3.3.2 Critical exponents: the correlation length
One aspect of the quantitative behaviour of materials at and near a continuous phase
transition, is the fact that the values of various quantities are given by power-laws,
i.e. by the value of some other quantity, raised to some power. More specifically:
critical points occur only at a specific temperature, the critical temperature Tc; and
near the critical point, the value of some quantity, v(Q) say, is given by a power of the
difference between the actual temperature T and Tc, or by a power of some similar
quantity such as the ratio of this difference to Tc:
v(Q) ∼ |T − Tc|p or v(Q) ∼ |T − Tc
Tc
|p (3.3)
where p is the power.
It is worth giving some examples of how the same power law (same p) can govern
the critical points of very disparate systems. This will show how striking universality
can be: which will be relevant to the philosophical discussion in Section 4.3. Besides,
since the renormalization group framework can correctly predict these power laws
for countless such systems, it will show the amazing success of the framework. My
examples will be drawn from condensed matter, not quantum field theory, since this
will be technically less demanding: water and steam are familiar, while quarks and
gluons are not. But I stress that this Section’s themes—phase transitions, critical
points, universality and the renormalization group successfully predicting the power
laws—nowadays also form a large subject within quantum field theories like QCD;
(e.g. Kogut and Stephanov 2004). But note: the details in the rest of this Subsection
are not needed in my closing philosophical discussion (Section 4), and so can be
skipped; nor will Section 4 need these themes in the form they take within quantum
field theories.
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In eq. 3.3, Q might be a quantity whose value is zero at the critical point (so that
p is positive). For example, Q might be:
(i) the difference ρliquid − ρgas between the densities of liquid water and of steam;
or
(ii) the average magnetization m of a piece of iron.
Or Q might be a quantity that diverges (i.e. goes to infinity) at the critical point (so
that p is negative). For example, Q might be
(i’) the isothermal compressibility κT of water: a measure of how compressible
it is, i.e. how the volume changes as a function of pressure, at fixed temperature T
(formally: κT = −∂V /∂p|T ); or
(ii’) the magnetic susceptibility of iron: a measure of how magnetizable it is, i.e.
how its magnetization changes as a function of an external applied magnetic field B,
at fixed temperature T ; (formally: χT = −∂m/∂B|T ).
In these four examples, it is obvious enough that (i), the difference ρliquid − ρgas,
vanishes at the critical point. For as I sketched in Section 3.3.1, each body of liquid
water contains much gas, which contains much liquid, and so on ... and vice versa.
A similar argument can be made that (ii) vanishes, and (i’) and (ii’) diverge, at their
respective critical points. But we do not need the details of why that is so, in order
to make universality vivid.
All I need is to report the striking, indeed amazing, fact that the two members of
each pair ((i) and (ii), (i’) and (ii’)) obey the same law. That is: (i) and (ii) obey the
same power-law, namely with p ≈ 0.35. In fact this p is written as β. So we have
ρliquid − ρgas ∼ |T − Tc|β and m ∼ |T − Tc|β; with β ≈ 0.35. (3.4)
Furthermore, this power-law, with almost the same value of β, describes corresponding
phase transitions in many other systems. Here is an example like (i): as one reduces
the temperature of a sample of liquid helium below 2 K (two degrees above absolute
zero, i.e. -271 degrees Celsius) another phase of helium (a superfluid phase: so-called
because it flows without viscosity) condenses out, rather like liquid water condensing
out of steam. This transition has a power law like eq. 3.4 with β ≈ 0.34. Another
example like (ii) is the magnetization of nickel: here, β ≈ 0.36.
Similarly, (i’) and (ii’) obey the same power-law, with nearly equal values of their
exponent p: namely p ∼ −1.2. By convention, this p is written as −γ, so that γ is
positive. So we have
κT ∼ |T − Tc|−γ and χT ∼ |T − Tc|−γ; with γ ≈ 1.2. (3.5)
Again, this power-law, with almost the same value of γ, describes corresponding
phase transitions in many other systems. Here is an example like (i’): a mixture of
two organic fluids (viz. trimethylpentane and nitroethane) has a critical point rather
like that of water-and-steam: the compressibility κT obeys a power law like eq. 3.5,
with γ ≈ 1.24. And for helium, i.e. our previous example like (i): the compressibility
33
has γ ≈ 1.33. Another example like (ii’) is the magnetic susceptibility of nickel: here,
γ ≈ 1.33.
β and γ are called critical exponents. By convention, critical exponents are defined
to be positive; so that if the quantity concerned diverges at the critical point, the
exponent/index in the power-law is minus the critical exponent. There are several
others. All of them encode some power-law behaviour of quantities at or near a critical
point: and each of them takes very nearly the same value for critical points occurring
in materials and processes that are microscopically very disparate. So again, we see
a striking universality of systems’ quantitative (albeit arcane!) behaviour.
I need not go into details, except to describe how two critical exponents, written
η and ν, encode the power-law behaviour near the critical point—not of straightfor-
wardly macroscopic quantities like the density, compressibility etc. so far mentioned—
but of measures of the microscopic correlations. Sketching this will bring us back to
Section 3.3.1’s central idea of scale-invariance.
One of course expects correlations between the states at different locations in a
material to decrease, as one considers more widely separated locations. Indeed, this
is so: and at or near critical points, the decrease is often given by a power of the
separation. Thus suppose we define as our measure of correlation, the expectation
(probabilistic average) of the product of local variables (often called ‘order param-
eters’) at the two locations, separated by distance r. This is often written G(r).17
At the critical temperature Tc, G(r) obeys a power law, for r large compared with
inter-molecular distances. Namely:
G(r) ∼ 1/rd−2+η (3.6)
where (i) d is the spatial dimension of the material (usually 3; but e.g. 2 for a
monoatomic or monomolecular layer, or a theoretical model of such), and (ii) η is
typically between 0 and 0.1. (In my examples, it is: (a) for the mixture of two
organic liquids and for helium, 0.02; (b) for iron, 0.07; (c) for nickel, 0.04.)
Near Tc, G(r) obeys, not a simple power law in r, but an exponential decrease:
G(r) ∼ exp(−r/ξ); (3.7)
which defines the length r = ξ over which G(r) decreases by about 66 % (e ≈ 2.7 so
that exp(−ξ/ξ) ≡ e−1 ≈ 1/3). This means that φ fluctuates in correlated blocks of
various sizes up to a length ξ, but blocks with a side-length much bigger than ξ are
very rare.
It is here that we see again the scale-invariance of the critical point—and so
its being an infra-red fixed point of the renormalization group flow. For as Tc is
17It is usually defined in terms of local variables φ by: (i) assuming spatial homogeneity so that
any two locations a distance r apart yield the same expectation, and one may as well choose the
origin 0 and some location r which is r units away, so that one would write G(r) = 〈φ(0) · φ(r)〉,
where 〈〉 indicates expectation; and (ii) subtracting away any background constant correlation in φ,
the better to study fluctuations, so that one writes G(r) := 〈φ(0) · φ(r)〉 − |〈φ〉|2.
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approached from above or from below, ξ grows without limit. Indeed, its behaviour is
described by (yet another!) power law: with a negative exponent so as to capture the
divergence, as with the−γ for (i’) and (ii’) above. That is: near Tc (i.e. |T−Tc|/Tc <<
1), we have
ξ ∼ |T − Tc|−ν (3.8)
where ν is typically about 2/3. Again, the approximate value 2/3 covers a whole class
of phenomena: for our four examples of the critical points for the two organic liquids,
helium, iron and nickel, the range of ν is from 0.62 (the liquids) to 0.69 (iron).18
Finally, a note of caution. My praise of the modern approach to renormalization,
with its successful calculation of critical exponents (and, needless to say: so much
else!), might give the impression that only with the renormalization group did physics
cotton on to the broad idea of coarse-graining a microscopic description to give a
macroscopic one, or of iterating a scheme for coarse-graining, so as to understand
scale-invariant phenomena, and in particular to calculate critical exponents.
That is not so. Before the renormalization group analyses were developed, vari-
ous approaches to understanding these phenomena had considerable, albeit partial,
success. That is of course hardly surprising, since the ideas of coarse-graining, and
iterating a scheme for coarse-graining, are so natural. But it is worth emphasizing:
not just so as to honour the previous work, but also to avoid philosophers getting
the false impression that only with the renormalization group did physics pick up on
the idea of multiple realizability. In short: the renormalization group is of course a
scientific triumph, and a stimulus to philosophical relection—but that does not imply
that it harbours entirely novel morals for philosophy. Section 4 will expand on this
irenic theme.19
3.3.3 Short distances: a natural lower limit
This Section has stressed the analogy between the renormalization group framework
for quantum field theory and for condensed matter. But I should end by noting two
main differences; the second will be more important. (Of course, there are also many
differences of detail.)
First: I have spoken impartially of the renormalization group flow going (i) towards
long distances, the infra-red (Sections 3.1 and 3.3.1), and (ii) towards short distances,
18This discussion, especially the data cited, is based on Binney et al. (1992, pp. 7-8, 18-20, 22).
19Two broad previous approaches are mean field theory and Landau theory. For a glimpse of what
these are and their predictive limitations, in the context of condensed matter, cf. e.g. Kadanoff
(2009, Sections 2,3; 2013, Sections 1.2.4-4, pp. 147-164) and Binney et al. (1992, pp. 22, 176-177,
183-184). In particular, mean field theory implies values for the critical exponents I have discussed,
as follows: β = 0.5, γ = 1, η = 0, ν = 0.5. As to the false impression that within physics only the
renormalization group describes multiple realizability: I think this impression is fostered by some
philosophers’ praise of the renormalization group; e.g. Batterman (2002, pp. 37-44), Morrison (2012,
p. 156, p.160 (both paragraph 2)).
35
the ultra-violet (Section 3.2). But broadly speaking, a flow towards the infra-red is
often defined by (iterated) coarse-graining. And since coarse-graining involves a loss
of microscopic information, such a flow is in general many-one, i.e. irreversible: this
underpinned Section 3.3.1’s idea of two disparate microscopic Hamiltonians flowing
to the same infra-red fixed point. So there is no well-defined inverse flow towards the
ultra-violet. (And in the jargon of group theory, one should thus say ‘renormalization
semi-group’, not ‘renormalization group’; but the latter name has stuck.) This point
is not meant to suggest there is a problem, or even a puzzle, about such irreversible
flows. The exact definition of the flow is up to the theorist, and of course varies from
theory to theory, and according to the theorist’s purposes. Thus the flow towards the
infra-red is not always defined by coarse-graining (loss of information); so in some
cases it is indeed reversible, and there is a well-defined flow to the ultra-violet.20
The second difference is about the ultra-violet regime. Namely: quantum field
theory lacks, but condensed matter has, a natural lower limit to the lengths d and
L. In more detail: quantum field theories, being field theories, assume a spacetime
continuum. Although I pointed out that we can make sense of such theories without
spacetime being a continuum, namely as describing physics at low enough energies,
large enough distances (Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3), these theories are undoubtedly
conceived and presented as involving a continuum. After all, that was the rationale
for the core task, on the traditional approach to renormalization in Sections 2.3 and
2.4: to assign bare coupling constants at each value of the cut-off d, so as to recover
the physical coupling constants (cf. eq. 2.9). Similarly for L and µ. In a theory
assuming a spacetime continuum, there is no a priori obstacle to arbitrarily short-
distance, high-energy phenomena—L can be arbitrarily small, µ arbitrarily high.
But in condensed matter, the inter-atomic or inter-molecular distance gives a
natural lower limit to the length-scales at which we trust our analyses. Thus recall
that in Section 3.3.1, I said the critical point involves scale-invariance, ‘until we reach
molecular dimensions, where, of course, the alternation between the phases breaks
down’. More generally: we of course expect our definition of the renormalization
group flow, by which one “vector” of physical coupling constants (or: one Hamiltonian
or Lagrangian) replaces another as the energy scale increases (distance scale decreases)
to break down at molecular or atomic scales. (Or of course at larger length-scales, if
some new physics “kicks in” there, which our definition of the flow has disregarded: an
example would be spatially periodic inhomogeneities with, say, a mesoscopic period.)
Similarly of course, for theoretical models rather than real samples. The classic
example is modelling a crystal as a spatially periodic lattice of sites representing
atoms or nuclei. In such a model, the lattice spacing provides the natural lower
limit. To sum up: at this limit, the renormalization group transformation—the step
along the flow towards the ultra-violet that “zooms in” by an increment—cannot be
iterated.
20Cf. e.g. Kadanoff (2013, Section 8.5, p.181). I say there is ‘not even a puzzle’; but it can be
confusing—witness the exchanges between Cao and Fisher which pepper Cao (1999a).
36
Mention of lattice models in condensed matter prompts a final remark, to complete
my description of quantum field theory. Namely, lattice models are also crucial there:
but with a lattice of sites throughout a region of spacetime, rather than space. We
can easily state two broad reasons why.
(1): Since quantum field theories are complicated, one often cannot solve one’s
problem analytically (even with perturbation theory, power series etc.) and so needs
to solve it numerically, i.e. on a computer: which involves discretizing the field vari-
ables, i.e. assigning them to sites of a lattice rather than the continuum of spacetime
points.
(2): I enthused about QCD’s asymptotic freedom: that the theory becomes very
simple, indeed free, at arbitrarily high energies. But consider the other side of this
coin: as the energy is lowered, the interaction becomes stronger. Of course it was
realized already in the 1930s that the interaction holds the nucleus together, over-
coming the electrostatic repulsion among the protons. Hence its name, ‘strong’, given
long before QCD and asymptotic freedom were found. This strength means a large
physical coupling constant, and so difficulties for a perturbative expansion (cf. Sec-
tion 2.2.1’s discussion of ε and α): difficulties that led in the 1950s and 1960s to
scepticism that any perturbative quantum field theory could describe the interaction.
Again there is jargon: the increasing strength at larger distances is called infra-red
slavery, and the ever-tighter binding of quarks as they try to separate (which prevents
us seeing a lone quark) is called confinement; (e.g. Wilczek 2005, Sections 1.1, 3.1).
But jargon aside, the predicament that the theory is complicated and very hard to
calculate in prompts lattice models and the hunt for numerical solutions.
4 Nagelian reflections
So much by way of reviewing renormalization, in both the traditional and modern
approaches. In this final Section, I turn briefly to philosophy. I will confine myself
to urging a moral which honours Ernest Nagel. Namely: the material in Sections 2
and 3 fits well with Nagel’s account of reduction; and indeed, Hempel’s deductive-
nomological account of explanation. In particular, the idea of universality (Sections
3.1.4 and 3.3.2) is a case of the philosophical idea of multiple realizability, and does
not cause problems for Nagelian reduction.
That is good news for me, since in previous work I joined others in endorsing
Nagel’s account, and in arguing that multiple realizability is no threat to Nagelian
reductions (2011, Sections 3 and 4; and for renormalization, 2014). I will not repeat
any of the details of those arguments here.21 I will just sketch Nagel’s account (Section
21Not that Nagel’s doctrines about explanation, reduction and inter-theoretic relations need my
endorsement: especially since, happily, his stock-price is rising. For example, one recent defence of
Nagel’s account, and similar accounts such as Schaffner’s (1967, 1976), is Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg
and Hartmann (2010); and Schaffner has recently given a masterly review of this literature, and
defence of his own account (2013). As to multiple realizability not threatening Nagelian reduction,
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4.1) and describe how the material I have reviewed illustrates it (Section 4.2). Finally
in Section 4.3 I will urge that universality is just multiple realizability.
But before setting out, I note as an appetizer for another occasion, two philosoph-
ical topics prompted by the material in Sections 2 and 3.
(1): Real infinities?: Should we acquiesce in the traditional approach’s acceptance
of infinite bare coupling constants (Section 2.4)? I noted there that most physicists
find such physically real, albeit unmeasurable, infinities intellectually uncomfortable;
and for all the achievements of the modern approach (especially Sections 3.1, 3.3.2),
this approach does not expunge these infinities. So what should a philosopher say
about such infinities: are they acceptable?22
(2): Instrumentalism?: The dwindling of non-renormalizable terms in the infra-
red prompted the effective field theory programme, with its vision of a succession
of theories, each accurately describing one energy range, but inaccurate beyond it—
suggesting an instrumentalist attitude (Section 3.1.3). But of course, this dwindling
(and allied technical considerations) do not make such an attitude compulsory, espe-
cially if we think there are good prospects for getting an empirically adequate and
rigorously defined interacting quantum field theory: prospects that are certainly en-
hanced by QCD’s asymptotic freedom (cf. the end of Section 3.2). So what attitude
should we adopt? The answer is bound to be controversial, since it is an example
of the broad, and maybe unending, philosophical debate between varieties of instru-
mentalism and of realism.23
4.1 Nagel endorsed
The traditional philosophical jargon is that one theory T1 reduces to, or is reducible
to, another T2 if, roughly speaking, T1 is a part of T2. To explicate this,
24 I first
introduce mnemonic subscripts, to avoid confusion between T1 and T2.
For the reducing theory, I will use b: ‘b’ is for bottom/basic/best; ‘bottom’ and ‘ba-
sic’ connoting microscopic and fundamental, and ‘best’ connoting a successor theory.
And for the reduced theory, I will use t: ‘t’ is for top/tangible/tainted; ‘top’ and ‘tangi-
I endorse Sober (1999).
22In some of his work, Batterman has advocated physically real infinities (e.g. 2005, pp. 235-
236). But beware: this is a different topic. For it rests on different considerations than infinite bare
coupling constants in renormalization theory: viz. (i) singular limits, and (ii) the need to take a
limit, so as to describe or explain a distinctive phenomenon, e.g. the thermodynamic limit so as to
get a phase transition. For my own assessment of his arguments about (i) and (ii), cf. my (2011a,
Section 3; 2014, Section 5.1).
23For more discussion, with an emphasis on renormalization and the idea of “reductionism”, cf.: (i)
Cao (1993), Schweber (1993), Cao and Schweber (1993), Cao (1997, Section 11.4 pp. 339-352); (ii)
the brief contrasting discussions by Weinberg (1999, pp. 246-250) and Redhead (1999, pp. 38-40);
(iii) responses to Cao and Schweber by Hartmann (2001) and Castellani (2002); and more recently,
(iv) Bain (2013, 2013a) and my (2014, Section 5.3) .
24Of course, we can and should admit that ‘reduction’, used as a relation between theories, is
vague (my 2011, Section 1.1.2). But this is undoubtedly the core idea.
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ble’ connoting macroscopic and observable, and ‘tainted’ connoting a predecessor the-
ory. Thus I will say that a theory Tb ≡ Tbottom/basic/best reduces Tt ≡ Ttop/tangible/tainted;
and that Tt reduces to, or is reducible to, Tb.
Nagel’s main idea is to take theories as linguistic entities, viz. sets of sentences
closed under deducibility, and hold that Tt is reduced to Tb by:
(1) Deducibility: being shown to be logically deducible from Tb, usually together
with some judiciously chosen definitions; and
(2) Constraints: the deduction satisfying some informal constraints, e.g. about
the derivation counting an explanation of its conclusion.
Before I give some details about (1) and (2), in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 respec-
tively, my first and most important comment is that taking theories as sets of sen-
tences does not imply that the language of the theories, or the notion of deducibility,
be formalized (let alone first-order). Nagel and his supporters (including Schaffner
et al. listed in footnote 21) of course know that scientific theories are not formal-
ized, and are hardly likely to be, even in mathematized subjects like physics. But
that does not prevent one undertaking to assess whether there are relations of reduc-
tion between theories (in Nagel’s sense; or indeed, in another one). The informality
merely makes one’s specification of the theories, definitions and deducibility relation,
somewhat vague; and so one’s ensuing assessments are correspondingly tentative.25
4.1.1 Deducibility
The syntactic conception of theories immediately gives a notion of Tt being a part of
Tb, viz. when Tt’s sentences, i.e. theorems, are a subset of Tb’s.
In logic, with its formalized languages, this is called Tt being a sub-theory of
Tb. But the notion of course applies to unformalized languages. One just has to
recognize that which sentences are in a given theory is almost always vague, even when
the theory’s name is very specific (e.g. ‘equilibrium classical statistical mechanics
of N point-particles in a cube with side-length l’, rather than ‘classical statistical
mechanics’). And to avoid merely verbal disputes, one must adopt a swings-and-
roundabout attitude about whether a given Tt is part of a given Tb. For it all depends
on how one makes the two theories, i.e. their sets of sentences, precise; (cf. my 2011,
Section 3.1.2; and Schaffner (2013, Section II p. 7, Section VI, p. 29)).
So although scientific theories are of course unformalized, I will continue to use
logical jargon, saying e.g. that a theory has a set of sentences, a language has a set
of predicates etc. I will also set aside the questions of what a theory’s underlying
25I agree that the tenor of Nagel’s writings—and of his times—also suggests a narrower, and I admit
implausible, account requiring that theories, definitions and deductions, be formalized. (Thanks to
Bob Batterman and Jim Weatherall for emphasizing this.) I say a bit more about this, and the rival
“semantic view” of theories in my (2011, Sections 3, 4; 2014, Section 1.2). I should also note that,
on the other hand, some writers have for various reasons criticized the notion of a scientific theory,
even if theories are not taken as linguistic entities; and have even invoked quantum field theories in
their support. I reply to this line of thought, in the companion paper (2014, Section 4.1).
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logic is (first-order vs. second-order etc.) and what its mathematical apparatus is
(containing set theory, calculus etc.), since for unformalized theories these questions
also are vague. So I just refer non-commitally to ‘deduction’.
However, one still needs to avoid confusion arising from the same predicate, or
other non-logical symbol, occurring in both theories, but with different intended inter-
pretations. This can be addressed by taking the theories to have disjoint non-logical
vocabularies, and then defining Tt to be a definitional extension of Tb, iff one can
add to Tb a set D of definitions, one for each of Tt’s non-logical symbols, in such a
way that Tt becomes a sub-theory of the augmented theory Tb ∪D. That is: In the
augmented theory, we can deduce every theorem of Tt.
Note that here again, I mean the word ‘definition’ as it is used in logic: roughly
speaking, a definition states that a given “new” non-logical symbol e.g. a predi-
cate, the definiens, is co-extensive with some (maybe very long) open sentence, the
definiendum. There is no formal requirement that a definition be faithful to some
previous meaning (or some other properties) of the definiens: I shall return to this in
Section 4.1.2.A.
This is the core formal part of Nagelian reduction: (1) Deducibility, in the above
notation. The definitions are usually called ‘bridge laws’ (or ‘bridge principles’ or
‘correspondence rules’).26
4.1.2 Informal constraints on reduction
4.1.2.A: Deducibility is too weak Various philosophers have said that even if
Tt is a definitional extension of Tb, there can be non-formal aspects of Tt that are
not encompassed by (are not part of) the corresponding aspects of Tb; and that, at
least in some cases, these aspects seem essential to Tt’s functioning as a scientific
theory. Nagel agrees with the general point that deducibility is too weak, and (1961,
pp. 358-363) adds some informal conditions, mainly motivated by the idea that the
reducing theory Tb should explain the reduced theory Tt; and following Hempel, he
conceives explanation in deductive-nomological terms. Thus he says, in effect, that
Tb reduces Tt iff:
(i): Tt is a definitional extension of Tb; and
(ii): in each of the definitions of Tt’s terms, the definiens in the language of Tb
must play a role in Tb; so it cannot be, for example, a heterogeneous disjunction.
Nagel’s proposal (ii) has got some good press; e.g. Sklar (1967, pp. 119-123),
Nickles (1973, pp. 190-194). But some philosophers neglect this proposal and-or
object that it does not secure what is needed. The most common objection appeals
to multiple realizability. The leading idea is that the definiens of a multiply realizable
26The standard references are Nagel (1961, pp. 351-363; and 1979); cf. also Hempel (1966, Chapter
8). Discussions of bridge laws are at Nagel (1961, pp. 354-358; 1979, 366-368) and Hempel (1966,
pp. 72-75, 102-105). My notation Deducibility thus covers the conditions Nagel calls ‘derivability’
(about logical consequence) and ‘connectability’ (about definitions); cf. the discussion in Schaffner
(2013, Section I). In Section 4.1.2 I will mention revisions by authors such as Schaffner.
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property shows it to be too “disjunctive” to be suitable for scientific explanation, or
to enter into laws. And pace Nagel’s proposal (ii) above, some philosophers think
that multiple realizability prompts a non-Nagelian account of reduction.
These lines of thought are most familiar in the philosophy of mind, with the mul-
tiple realizability argument of Putnam (1975) and Fodor (1974). Kim’s work provides
an example which specifically targets Nagelian reduction. He calls it ‘philosophically
empty’ and ‘irrelevant’, because Nagelian bridge laws are ‘brute unexplained prim-
itives’; (1999, p. 134; 2006, p. 552; and similarly in other works e.g. (2005, pp.
99-100): cf. also e.g. Causey (1972, p. 412-421)). Kim’s own account, called a ‘func-
tional model of reduction’, takes reduction to include:
(a) functional definitions of the higher-level properties P etc., i.e. definitions that
quantify over properties so as to characterise P by its pattern of relations (usually
causal and-or nomic) to various other properties; and
(b) a lower-level description of the (variety-specific) realizers of P etc., and of how
they fulfill the functional roles spelt out in (a).
But as announced, I reject these lines of thought. I believe multiple realizability,
and functional definitions, give no argument against definitional extension; nor even
against stronger notions of reduction like Nagel’s, that add further constraints addi-
tional to deducibility, e.g. about explanation. That is: I believe that such constraints
are entirely compatible with multiple realizability. I maintain (2011, Sections 3.1.1
and 4.1.1) that this was shown persuasively by Sober (1999).27. I will not repeat the
rebuttal. Let me just sum up: there is no tension between Nagelian reduction and
the fact of multiple realizability.
4.1.2.B: Deducibility is too strong The other traditional criticism of Nagelian
reduction goes in the “opposite direction”. Instead of saying that Deducibility is too
weak, it says that Deducibility is too strong. The idea is that in many cases where
Tb reduces Tt, Tb corrects, rather than implies, Tt.
28
But as an objection to Nagel, this is an ignoratio elenchi. For Nagel himself
made this point. He said that a case in which Tt’s laws are a close approximation to
what strictly follows from Tb should count as reduction. He called this approximative
27Sober mostly targets Putnam and Fodor; for critiques of Kim, cf. Marras (2002, pp. 235-237,
240-247), Needham (2009, pp. 104-108)
28This objection is made by e.g. Kemeny and Oppenheim (1956), and Feyerabend (1962). One
standard example is Newtonian gravitation theory (Tb) and Galileo’s law of free fall (Tt). This
Tt says that bodies near the earth fall with constant acceleration. This Tb says that as they fall,
their acceleration increases, albeit by a tiny amount. But surely Tb reduces Tt. And similarly in
many famous and familiar examples of reduction in physics: wave optics corrects geometric optics,
relativistic mechanics corrects Newtonian mechanics etc.
These examples put limiting relations between theories centre-stage. And quite apart from as-
sessing Nagel, such relations have long been a major focus for philosophers of the physical sciences:
as also in recent years, cf. e.g. Batterman (2002, 2013), Norton (2012). My own views about these
relations are in (2011a): which takes as one of its examples, phase transitions, especially Section
3.3.1’s topic of critical points; (cf. also Bouatta and Butterfield (2011, 2012).
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reduction (1979, pp. 361-363, 371-373). (Cf. also Hempel (1965, p. 344-346; 1966,
pp. 75-77). In a similar vein, Schaffner (1967, p. 144; 1976, p. 618) requires a strong
analogy between Tt and its corrected version, i.e. what strictly follows from Tb).
Against this, critics have complained that it is too programmatic, since it gives
no general account of when an approximation or analogy is close enough. But in
Nagel’s and Schaffner’s defence, I would say that (a) we should not expect, and (b)
we do not need, any such general account.29 What matters, both scientifically and
conceptually, is that in a given case we can deduce that Tt’s proposition (whether a
description of particular fact, or a general theorem/law) is approximately true; and
that we can quantify how good the approximation is.
4.2 Renormalizability deduced at low energies as a family of
Nagelian reductions
I now conclude by discussing how renormalization illustrates Nagelian reduction. I
will confine myself to the topic announced in Section 1: how the modern approach,
with its explanation that our good fortune in having renormalizable theories is generic
(Section 3.1), accords with Nagelian reduction.
As I said in Section 1, I think philosophers should take note, not just of this specific
achievement, but of the general idea of a space of theories. This fosters a novel and
more ambitious kind of explanatory project than the familiar ones of explaining an
individual event, or a single law, or (as in Section 4.1) a theory as a part of, or a good
approximation to, another. Namely: to explain a feature of a whole class of theories
in a unified way in terms of the structure of the space of theories.
But I will not develop this general theme, but instead concentrate on my main
claim, as follows:
The deduction from a given theory Tb that describes (perhaps using non-
renormalizable terms) high-energy physics, of a renormalizable theory Tt
describing low energy physics, is a Nagelian reduction. Besides: for differ-
ent pairs of theories Tb and Tt, varying across the space of quantum field
theories, the reductive relation is similar, thanks to a shared definition of
the renormalization group flow, i.e. of the renormalization scheme.
I will fill this out with five short remarks, rehearsing previous material. As regards
the philosophical assessment of Nagel’s account of reduction, the most important of
these remarks are (3), about approximative reduction, and (4), about unity among a
family of reductions.
29I am not alone in this defence: cf. Nickles (1973, p. 189, 195), Schaffner (2013, Section III) and
Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg and Hartmann (2010: Section 3.1, p. 409f.). In a similar vein, the latter
argue (their Section 5) that Nagelian reduction does not need to settle once for all whether bridge
laws state “mere” correlations, law-like correlations or property-identities: (which are Nagel (1961)’s
three options, at pp. 354-357). I entirely agree, pace authors like Kim and Causey cited in Section
4.1.2.A.
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(1): I have specified a theory by a Hamiltonian or Lagrangian. Recall the vector of
physical coupling constants g1(µ), ..., gN(µ) which I first introduced in Section 2.5.1,
and took as a point in a space of theories at the start of Section 3.
(2): A renormalization scheme that defines a flow towards lower energies (a scheme
for coarse-graining so as to eliminate higher-energy degrees of freedom) amounts to
the set of definitions D, in logicians’ broad sense (Section 4.1.1), needed to make the
deduction of Tt from Tb go through.
(3): Since at low energies any non-renormalizable terms in Tb still make non-zero,
albeit dwindling, contributions to the theory’s predictions (probabilities for various
processes), we have here an approximative reduction (Section 4.1.2.B); though the
approximation gets better and better as the energy decreases.
(4): A given renormalization scheme (definition of the flow) works to show that
many theories Tb lead to a renormalizable low-energy theory Tt . This unity is strik-
ing. Hence this Section’s title’s use of the word ‘family’: since ‘family’ connotes
resemblance, which ‘set’ does not.
(5): Agreed: no single renormalization scheme works to prove that all possible
theories have dwindling non-renormalizable contributions in the infra-red. And as
I have often admitted: the proofs concerned are often not mathematically rigorous.
But the various renormalization schemes that have been devised do not contradict one
another, and in fact mesh in various ways. So it is fair to say that a generic quantum
field theory has dwindling non-renormalizable contributions in the infra-red. As I
said in Section 3.1: a satisfying explanation of our good fortune.30
So to sum up: the modern approach to renormalization gives a stunning case
of explaining something that is otherwise—i.e. on the traditional approach—a co-
incidence. The coincidence is, in short, that the theory in question, e.g. quantum
electrodynamics, has a feature, viz. renormalizability, that seems crucial to it “mak-
ing sense”. This feature also holds of other theories; indeed, it holds of the whole
standard model of particle physics, which combines quantum electrodynamics with
quantum theories of the weak and strong forces. Thus the coincidence is so grand and
important that it seems like manna from heaven; or more prosaically, it seems that
renormalizability is in some sense an a priori selection-principle for quantum theories.
But adopting the modern approach, we can deduce that what seemed manna from
heaven is in a sense to be expected.
4.3 Universality is multiple realizability
My final point is a brief ancillary one. In Section 3.1.4, I introduced ‘universality’ as
jargon for the idea that dissimilar theories might have similar infra-red behaviour: in
particular, the same infra-red fixed point. In Section 3.3.2, we saw vivid examples of
30That a satisfying explanation should show the explanandum to be generic has of course been a
theme in cosmological speculations about explaining initial conditions: not just nowadays, but over
the centuries; cf. McMullin (1993).
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this. The dissimilar theories were of utterly different quantities in utterly different
systems: e.g. a density difference in a mixture of water and steam, or in a mixture
of two phases of liquid helium; or the magnetization of a piece of iron or nickel. And
the similar behaviour was quantitatively exact, albeit arcane: the same values of
critical exponents in power laws describing near-critical behaviour. In the examples
just mentioned, it was the critical exponent β in eq. 3.4. Corresponding remarks
apply to the exponents γ, η and ν, in eq. 3.5, 3.6 and 3.8 respectively.
These examples obviously illustrate multiple realizability in the sense introduced
in Section 4.1.2.A. To take just my first example: having a value of β equal to about
0.35 as in eq. 3.4 is a multiply realizable property. A water-steam mixture has it; so
does a mixture of two phases of liquid helium. Similarly for Section 4.1.2.A’s idea of
a functional definition of a property, viz. specifying a pattern of relations to other
properties: clearly, having β ≈ 0.35 is a functional property.
But recall that I join Sober (1999) in seeing no tension between Nagelian reduction
and multiple realizability, with the consequent need for functional definitions. So I
also see no trouble for Nagelian reduction in universality: e.g. in critical exponents,
whether calculated using the renormalization group or using older approaches like
mean field theory (cf. footnote 19). In particular, I see no trouble for Section 4.2’s
main claim that to coarse-grain a class of theories towards their common infra-red
fixed point—zooming out our descriptions in each theory, towards longer distances—
is to give a unified family of Nagelian reductions.
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